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Show Me The Money: Movie Quotes as Intellectual Property 
by Rebecca Shaw
ABstrAct
 Movie quotes are valuable.  They make movie 
studios money and enrich our cultural lexicon through 
our everyday quoting of movie lines.  These movie 
quotes have value, but are they protectable?  And if so, 
which legal regime would extend protection to movie 
quotes?  After reviewing the relevant legal landscape, 
this article determines that these valuable phrases 
could be protected under copyright and trademark law 
by the courts in infringement actions.  But how far 
should this protection stretch?  Extending protection 
to movie quotes presents the unsettling possibility of 
overprotection, which can lead to the restriction of free 
expression and the shrinking of our cultural commons.  
In light of these concerns, this article argues that movie 
quotes warrant a very limited scope of protection—
something akin to moral rights.  It is only through a 
narrow scheme of protection that the public’s right of 
free expression and our cultural commons can avoid 
peril. 
IntroductIon
 How much would you pay for a word?  A 
phrase?  A sentence?  Phrases are worth millions of 
dollars.  Just ask Michael Buffer, the proud owner of 
the trademark “Let’s get ready to rumble.”1  In three 
years, the trademark raked in $150 million through 
licensing and infringement litigation.2  The value of 
phrases and words is also evident in the movie industry, 
as words and phrases compose the scripts that are the 
essence of movies.  And why not?  The movie industry 
stands as one of the leading revenue generators in the 
United States.3  Production companies will pay for their 
1.  LET’S GET READY TO RUMBLE, Registration No. 
2,405,492.
2.  Andrew Chang, Squeezing Millions from a Phrase: How a 
Few Words, in the Right Hands, Can Mean a Fortune, ABcnews.
com, Apr. 11, 2002, http://abcnews.go.com/International/
story?id=80018. 
3.  In 2002, the United States combined projected revenue for 
motion pictures, television, and video was $17 billion.  stePhen 
e. sIwek, coPYrIght IndustrIes In the u.s. economY: the 2004 
rePort v, 9 (2004) (noting that the report was prepared for the 
International Intellectual Property Association).  “There were 
$13.8 billion in film and television exports in 2009, up 3% over 
words.  In 2007, the script for The Lovely Bones sold 
for $70 million.4  Production companies use titles—
words and short phrases—to market their movies, and 
they spend a good deal of money on them too.  In the 
1990s, Disney paid $600 thousand for the rights to the 
movie title “Ransom.”5
These figures illustrate the immense value 
inherent to these words.  What if movie production 
companies took after Mr. Buffer and proactively tried 
to capitalize on the value of their movie quotes outside 
of merchandising,6 pursuing other legal avenues for 
revenue generation and value exploitation?  Mr. Buffer 
lamented the fact that no one capitalized on the famous 
quote “Show me the money!” from Jerry Maguire.7  
The time may come when a production company 
sets up a strategy to mine the dormant gold from its 
characters’ words.  Our intellectual property laws do 
not, and should not, support rights holders overreaching 
and taking these quotes from the mouths of those who 
have a right to use them.
This article analyzes whether movie quotes are 
protectable under two intellectual property regimes—
copyright and trademark law—and the rights of 
publicity, as the potential protection of movie quotes 
depends on how and why the words are used.8  Even 
2008, and up 37% over 2005.”  motIon PIcture AssocIAtIon oF 
AmerIcA, the economIc contrIButIon oF the motIon PIcture & 
teLevIsIon IndustrY to the unIted stAtes (2010).  Further, the 
motion picture “industry had a positive services trade surplus of 
$11.9 billion in 2009, or 8% of the total U.S. private-sector trade 
surplus in services.”  Id.  Additionally, “the motion picture and 
television services surplus was larger than the surpluses of the 
telecommunications, management and consulting, legal, medical, 
computer, and insurance services sectors.”  Id.  In 2002, the revenue 
generated through box office sales was $9.1 billion.   MOTION 
PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, THEATRICAL 
MARKET STATISTICS (2011). 
4.  Patrick Goldstein, Cost of Movie Scripts Adds up to a 
Lot More Than Just Dollars, chI. trIB., June 10, 2007, at Arts 
& Entertainment 15, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.
com/2007-06-10/news/0706080609_1_scripts-lovely-bones-
dreamworks.
5.  Patrick Goldstein, Hey, Let’s Play the Movie Title Game!, 
Los AngeLes tImes, Aug. 20, 1997, at F1, available at http://articles.
latimes.com/1997/aug/20/entertainment/ca-24037.
6.  “Merchandising is a multi-billion dollar enterprise.”  
JoAnnA r. JeremIAh, merchAndIsIng InteLLectuAL ProPertY rIghts 
§ 1.1, at 1 (1997).
7.  Chang, supra note 2.
8.  See Richard W. Stim, E.T. Phone Home: The Protection 
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if movie quotes are protectable, significant policy 
arguments strongly oppose making movie quotes the 
property of one rights holder.
 In Part I, a review of the relevant legal 
landscape, this article determines whether movie quotes 
are protectable under any of the three legal regimes.  
Protection of movie quotes boils down to what is 
known as the “if value, then right” theory.  If something 
is valuable, one should have the right to exploit it 
and, more importantly, the corollary right to receive 
revenues from that exploitation.  Because value exists 
in these movie quotes, which are arguably independent 
property rights, someone should have a right to exploit 
them.
 This article first reviews the current state 
of copyright law because movie quotes are pieces 
of larger copyrightable works—scripts and motion 
pictures.  Consequently, movie quotes might find some 
level of protection as literary works under this regime.  
This article determines that courts will protect movie 
quotes under copyright law, although these quotes are 
not copyrightable.9  In doing so, this article identifies 
the danger of courts allowing copyright holders to use 
a single movie quote—without anything more—to 
defeat a claim of fair use in an infringement action.  
Consequently, current copyright law could allow an 
uncopyrightable quote from a copyrighted movie script 
to prevent any use of the script, thus making the movie 
quote a powerful and silencing rights-protection tool.  
This article addresses this chilling proposition in depth.
 This article proceeds by considering 
the protection of movie quotes under the law of 
trademarks, as movie quotes are embedded in our 
culture and are strongly associated with particular 
movies.  This article reviews the objectives of the 
Lanham Act and the basic legal framework for the 
protection of a mark.  This article then applies these 
propositions to movie quotes, concluding that they 
cannot be used as trademarks in connection with a 
movie.
Finally, this article considers the potential 
value of rights of publicity, which have been extended 
to catchphrases.  By analyzing the right of publicity not 
of an actor, a producer, or even a fictional character, 
but of a movie itself, current law suggests that movie 
of Literary Phrases, 7 u. mIAmI ent. & sPorts L. rev. 65, 67–68 
(1989).
9.  This article delves into this distinction in the discussion 
below, but offers a brief summary here.  Generally, a movie quote is 
not sufficiently original to stand on its own as a copyrightable work. 
However, a movie quote can receive protection in an infringement 
action while still not being independently copyrightable, as a movie 
script would be.
quotes cannot be protected under rights of publicity.
After surveying the intellectual property 
landscape to determine if movie quotes are protectable 
intellectual property, this article presents several policy 
arguments in support of little to no protection of movie 
quotes under any legal regime.  First, movie quotes 
are part of the cultural commons.  By incorporating 
these quotes into our cultural lexicon, the public adds 
value to movie quotes, granting the public the right 
to use them freely.  Second, the overextension of 
intellectual property rights to movie quotes intrudes on 
First Amendment rights.  Finally, courts risk allowing 
trademark law to substitute for copyright protection by 
extending trademark protection to movie quotes.  In 
essence, aggressively protecting movie quotes would 
stifle our cultural commons and restrict free speech.
I. “there’s goLd In them thAr hILLs”10 — IF  
 vALue, then rIght
 
 The logic is simple: if something is valuable, 
then you should have the right to exploit that value 
by excluding others from using it.11  The right/value 
theory, the premise that “if value, then right,” has been 
primarily used in connection with establishing new 
property rights in intangible assets.12  However, this 
concept was controversial when first introduced13 and 
continues to be criticized by scholars.14  Nevertheless, 
courts use the right/value theory in common law to 
determine and enforce rights15 and could continue this 
10.  destrY rIdes AgAIn (Universal Pictures 1939).
11.  Lawrence Lessig nicely summarizes the theory through the 
lens of piracy when he writes:
Creative work has value; whenever I use, or take, or build 
upon the creative work of others, I am taking from them something 
of value.  Whenever I take something of value from someone else, 
I should have their permission.  The taking of something of value 
from someone else without permission is wrong.  It is a form of 
piracy.
LAwrence LessIg, Free cuLture 18 (Penguin eds., 1st ed. 
2005).
12.  Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239–
40 (1918) (finding value in “hot news” because the news was made 
valuable “as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, 
skill, and money”); see also Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing 
Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) (“Whether [something] 
be labelled [sic] a ‘property’ right is immaterial; for here, as often 
elsewhere, the tag ‘property’ simply symbolizes the fact that courts 
enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth.”). 
13.  See Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 246 (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“Property, a creation of law, does not arise from value, 
although exchangeable-a matter of fact.”).
14.  See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: 
Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 notre dAme 
L. rev. 397, 407 (1990) (“The fallacies in the right/value theory can 
be revealed in a number of ways.”).
15.  See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic 
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reliance to expand intellectual property rights.16
 Movie quotes have strong value.  In many 
instances, they can “sell” a movie through trailers 
or advertising, or entice people to see the movie 
repeatedly.  What is The Wizard of Oz without “[t]
here’s no place like home?”  Movie quotes imbue the 
movie with all of its memorable “moments”:17 “You 
had me at hello;”18 “This is the beginning of a beautiful 
friendship;”19 and “I think we’re going to need a bigger 
boat.”20  Each quote is “kind of a verbal shorthand for 
the film.”21
 Production companies invest time and money 
in movie quotes when they pour money into bidding 
on and developing a script before a film is even made.  
Actors deliver them with the perfect inflection, gesture, 
and nuance so that viewers repeat them, sometimes 
incessantly, when they leave the theater.22  Thus, the 
value of movie quotes derives from both the movie 
itself and the cultural value that it acquires when 
viewers fold it into their daily lives and, thus, into our 
culture.23  Regardless of the source of a movie quote’s 
value, either from the public or the movie itself, under 
the value/right theory production companies argue that 
they should have a right to exploit the enormous value 
their movie quote represents.  The question is, how far 
will production companies go to enforce and expand 
their rights in court?
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 532 (1987) (explaining that in the context 
of trademarks, “when a word acquires value ‘as the result of 
organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money’ by an 
entity, that entity constitutionally may obtain a limited property 
right in the word.”) (quoting Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 239). 
16.  See Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 405 (finding that courts are 
likely to use the value/right theory to expand the reach of trademark 
owners’ rights).
17.  Piet Levy, Yeah, Baby! You Heard It Here First: Quotes 
Speak for Themselves, but Had Help Learning to Talk, mILwAukee J. 
sentIneL, June 21, 2005, at E Cue.  These particular quotes are why 
the American Film Institute aired a three-hour special on the 100 
greatest American movie quotes.  One of the criteria for judging 
was “cultural impact,” in which jurors took into account whether 
viewers use the quotes in their own lives, whether the quote had 
circulated through popular culture, and whether the quote had 
become part of the American lexicon.  American Film Institute, AFI 
100 Years . . . 100 Movie Quotes, http://www.afi.com/100years/
quotes.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
18.  JerrY mAguIre (TriStar Pictures 1996).
19.  cAsABLAncA (Warner Bros. Pictures 1942).
20.  JAws (Zanuck/Brown Productions 1975).
21.  Levy, supra note 17 (quoting Michael T. Marsden, co-
editor of the Journal of Popular Film and Television).
22.  Donna Isabell Walker, “Yeah, Baby!,” greenvILLe news, 
Jan. 30, 2005, at D.1 (“Those lines and phrases can . . . worm their 
way into your vocabulary.”).
23.  See Levy, supra note 17 (showing that movie quotes have 
become part of popular culture); Walker, supra note 22 (writing that 
memorable quotes become part of our cultural lexicon).
A. “But you didn’t get his permission, 
and that’s copyright infringement”24 — 
Copyright
The most logical place to begin the analysis 
of potential protection of movie quotes is copyright, 
as this area of the law has directly addressed the 
protection of short phrases and words.  Copyright 
protection extends to creative works generally, such as 
movie scripts, novels, and song lyrics.  Copyright is 
a constitutionally based form of intellectual property 
protection that covers literary, dramatic, artistic, and 
certain other intellectual works.25  Screenplays qualify 
as copyrightable dramatic works, and movie quotes 
comprise parts of the screenplay.  If copyright protects 
the screenplay then, so the logic goes, why cannot 
copyright extend to a movie quote independent of the 
larger work?   For example, copyright would protect the 
script to Gone With the Wind and “Frankly, my dear, I 
don’t give a damn.”  With this in mind, this article first 
reviews the pertinent copyright law landscape and then 
applies these principles to determine if movie quotes 
could, indeed, stand alone as protectable intellectual 
property.
1. General Principles of Copyright Law
Copyright law promotes the progress of the 
arts and dissemination of knowledge by giving authors 
a limited monopoly in the exclusive rights to their 
works.26  To be entitled to copyright protection, a work 
must be original and “fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression.”27  Originality, in the context of copyright 
law, is not novelty, but rather independent creation.28  
To satisfy the originality requirement of copyright, 
a work must possess at least some minimal level of 
creativity.29  In Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone 
24.  the PeoPLe vs. LArrY FLYnt (Columbia Pictures 1996).
25.  u.s. const., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.  See generally 1 meLvILLe 
B. nImmer & dAvId nImmer, nImmer on coPYrIght § 1.08 (4th ed. 
1994 & Supp. 2010) (reviewing the scope of works protected under 
the Constitution); Tom Bragelman, Copyright Law in and Under 
the Constitution: The Constitutional Scope and Limits to Copyright 
Law in the United States in Comparison With the Scope and Limits 
Imposed by Constitutional and European Law on Copyright Law 
in Germany, 27 cArdozo Arts & ent L.J. 99, 104–09 (2009) 
(reviewing the scope of “writings” under the art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 of the 
Constitution).
26.  u.s. const., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.  This limited monopoly lasts 
for the author’s life plus 70 years.  17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
27.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
28.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
345 (1991).
29.  Id.
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Service Co.,30 the Supreme Court explained, “the 
requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a 
slight amount will suffice.”31  For instance, writing a 
short note on a cocktail napkin to remind yourself to 
take the trash out and pick up the kids would satisfy the 
originality requirement.32
Despite the low bar for originality, copyright 
does not extend to any “idea, procedure, process, 
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery.”33  Copyright only covers the expression of 
these uncopyrightable elements.34  This is known as 
the “idea/expression” dichotomy.35  It represents the 
proposition that facts and ideas are available for all to 
use, whereas an individual’s expression of these ideas 
and facts is copyrightable.36  For instance, you cannot 
copyright the idea of two young lovers whose families 
are feuding.  However, you can copyright the entire 
screenplay that originally expresses and plays out this 
very idea.37 
Related to the idea/expression dichotomy 
is the concept of merger, where the expression is so 
inextricably merged with an idea that that there are a 
limited number of ways in which to express the idea.38  
This is known as the “merger doctrine.”  For instance, 
there are only so many ways to describe grocery 
products on an online grocery shopping system, and 
accordingly, such descriptions are uncopyrightable.39  
There are also only so many ways to write certain 
movie quotes to express a crazy man’s threat, such as 
“You talkin’ to me?”,40 or a woman’s desire for a little 
breathing room, such as “I want to be alone.”41
Along with being original, a work must be 
30.  Id.
31.  Id. (presenting what is hereafter referred to as the “Feist 
rule”).
32.  See id.
33.  17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
34.  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 557 (1989); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879).
35.  Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 
(1991); see Baker, 101 U.S at 103.
36.  Feist, 499 U.S. at 350; Baker, 101 U.S. at 103.
37.  For example, how many versions of Romeo and Juliet 
have you seen?
38.  Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 
(1st Cir. 1967) (“When the uncopyrightable subject matter is 
very narrow, so that ‘the topic necessarily requires,’ if not only 
one form of expression, at best only a limited number, to permit 
copyrighting would mean that a party . . . by copyrighting a mere 
handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of future use” [of 
the expression.]) (internal citations omitted).
39.  See MyWebGrocer, LLC v. Hometown Info, Inc., 375 F.3d 
190, 194 (2d Cir. 2004).
40.  tAxI drIver (Columbia Pictures 1976).
41.  grAnd hoteL (Metro-Godlwyn-Mayer 1932).
“fixed” in a “tangible medium of expression.”42  The 
fixation requirement is flexible.  A movie script, and of 
course movie quotes, can be fixed on a movie reel, a 
DVD, a computer chip, a hard drive, and old-fashioned 
paper.43
In reviewing just the above principles of 
copyright law, one could legitimately conclude that a 
movie quote should be copyrightable.  A quote could 
be sufficiently original standing on its own and fixed 
in a tangible medium of expression.  However, the 
Copyright Office and a majority of the courts would 
disagree.
2. Copyright Office Policies and the 
Courts
As noted above, courts could consider arbitrary 
and fanciful original movie quotes copyrightable 
literary expression, as neither the Copyright Clause 
nor the Copyright Act rule out such copyrightability.44  
However, “mere words and short phrases, even if they 
occur in a copyrighted work, do not themselves enjoy 
protection against copying.”45  For example, literary 
titles are not copyrightable under the Copyright Act.46  
This proposition is based in part on the Copyright 
Office’s longstanding policy of barring registration of 
single words and short phrases.47  The Copyright Office 
has steadfastly held to this policy, even intervening 
where courts have attempted to expand copyright to 
single words and short phrases.48
An illustrative example of the Copyright 
Office’s adherence to its practice of not registering 
single words or short phrases is Cook v. Robbins,49 an 
42.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
43.  See id. § 101 (defining “fixed” as embodied in a medium 
“sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than 
transitory duration”).  Because movies and their respective scripts 
and quotes are sufficiently fixed, this article will not focus on the 
fixation requirement for copyright protection.
44.  See nImmer, supra note 25, § 2.16, at 185–86 (discussing 
the copyrightability of titles, which consist of short phrases).
45.  Arvelo v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) 
P27,493, at *2 (1st Cir. 1995).
46.  See nImmer, supra note 25, § 2.16, at 185 (“It is . . . 
clear, as a matter of statutory construction by the courts (as well as 
Copyright Office Regulations), that titles may not claim statutory 
copyright.”) (footnotes omitted).
47.  37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2005) (excluding from protection 
“[w]ords and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans”); 
see u.s. coPYrIght oFFIce, coPYrIght cIrcuLAr 34: coPYrIght 
ProtectIon not AvAILABLe For nAmes, tItLes, or short PhrAses 
(2010). 
48.  See Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright 
Law, 74 FordhAm L. rev. 575, 591 (2005).
49.  Cook v. Robbins, Nos. 98-36242, 99-35141 (9th Cir. Nov. 
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unpublished case from the Ninth Circuit.  Wade Cook 
was the author of a best-selling book titled Wall Street 
Money Machine, in which he used “his experiences 
as a former taxi cab driver to advocate strategies for 
stock and stock option transactions.”50  The Ninth 
Circuit found that two short phrases from Cook’s book 
were copyrightable, referring to evidence that the two 
phrases were, according to author Cook, “an ‘important 
part of my book.’”51  Two of the investment concepts 
that Cook developed for and presented in the book are 
the “meter drop” and the “rolling stock.”52  Anthony 
Robbins, a financial expert, taught several financial 
seminars in which the driving theme was the “ring 
toss concept.”  However, once Robbins read Cook’s 
Wall Street Money Machine, he incorporated “meter 
drop” and “rolling stock” into a new seminar called 
“Financial Power.”53  Specifically, the Financial Power 
seminar manual included the phrase “meter drop” nine 
times and “rolling stock” twice.54  In later editions 
of the Financial Power manual, the phrase “meter 
drop” appeared in six places, but “rolling stock” was 
eliminated.55
Cook filed for copyright infringement of Wall 
Street Money Machine based on eleven different 
passages from the Financial Power manual.56  The 
jury found that Robbins had infringed two of the four 
phrases at issue—“Money is made on the Meter Drop” 
and “No one I know has come up with a name for 
the type of investing I call ‘Rolling Stocks’”—and 
awarded Cook $655,900 in damages. 57  Subsequently, 
Robbins moved for judgment as a matter of law.  The 
judge granted the motion because Cook did not prove 
a causal relation between the infringing phrases and 
Robbins’s profits from his Financial Power seminars.58
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
district court and ordered the jury award to be 
reinstated.  The court based its reasoning on the Feist 
rule that to be entitled to copyright protection, a work 
must possess a minimal level of creativity and that the 
16, 2000).
50.  Id. at *3.
51.  Id.
52.  Id.  “Meter drop” describes the technique of making small 
gains in lieu of waiting for a single big transaction.  Id.  A “rolling 
stock” is “stock that tends to consistently roll up to a specific price 
point and then drop down to a specific price point in an obvious 
pattern of repeated waves.”  Id.
53.  Id. at *3–4.
54.  Id. at *4.
55.  Id.
56.  Id.
57.  Id. at *6.
58.  Id.
required level is extremely low to satisfy “originality.”59 
The court focused on Robbins’s testimony that he used 
Cook’s “unique phrases because of their creativity” 
and that he had never used the terms “meter drop” 
or “rolling stock” before reading Cook’s book.60  
Consequently, the court concluded that “Cook’s 
complete expressions in conveying the meaning of 
‘meter drop’ and ‘rolling stock’ are creative, even if 
only minimally so, and are protected by his copyright 
in Wall Street Money Machine.”61
The Ninth Circuit’s decision greatly concerned 
the Copyright Office, as it believed that the Ninth 
Circuit had ignored the “longstanding fundamental 
doctrine of copyright law” that copyright law does 
not protect short phrases.62  Further, the Office feared 
that if the decision from one of the leading copyright 
circuits stood, the Copyright Office’s “longstanding 
examination practices,” codified in Rule 202.1(a) 
and reflected in Compendium II: Copyright Office 
Practices,63 would be eroded.64  Consequently, the 
Office recommended to the Department of Justice that 
the United States intervene to request rehearing en 
banc.65  However, no intervention was required.  Before 
the U.S. Government had decided on a course of action, 
the parties settled and the Ninth Circuit ordered the 
withdrawal of the opinion.66
As evidenced by its planned intervention 
in Cook, the Copyright Office remains dedicated to 
maintaining the fundamental principle that single words 
and short phrases are unprotected by copyright.
Similar to the Copyright Office, courts 
generally67 do not find single words and short phrases 
59.  Id. at *12.
60.  Cook v. Robbins, Nos. 98-36242, 99-35141, at *12 (9th 
Cir. Nov. 16, 2000).
61.  Id. at *12–13.
62.  Letter from David O. Carson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. 
Copyright Office, to Robert E. Kopp, Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice (Dec. 13, 2000) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter 
Carson Letter I].  The letter even notes that the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged the “words and short phrases doctrine” in a previous 
case.  Id.; see Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, n. 7 
(9th Cir. 1993).
63.  The Compendium is the Office’s internal manual of 
guidelines for examination applications to register copyrights.  The 
Office is currently revising the Compendium.  u.s. coPYrIght 
oFFIce, PrIorItIes And sPecIAL ProJects oF the unIted stAtes 
coPYrIght oFFIce 13 (2011), available at http://www.copyright.gov/
docs/priorities.pdf.
64.  Carson Letter I, supra note 60.
65.  Id.
66.  Letter from David O. Carson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. 
Copyright Office, to Robert E. Kopp, Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice (Dec. 26, 2000) (copy on file with author); Hughes, supra 
note 46, at 591.
67.  Generally does not mean never, as Cook v. Robbins 
demonstrates.  See Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson 
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copyrightable because they do not possess the requisite 
amount of originality to receive copyright protection.68  
Many courts refer to Rule 202.1(a) in making this 
decision.69  For instance, the Central District of 
California District Court, in Columbia Pictures Indus. 
v. Miramax Films Corp.,70 refused to consider a 
copyright infringement claim in the movie tag line 
Univ. Hosp., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1238 (D. Colo. 2009) (“[I]
t does not make sense to state categorically that no combination 
of numbers or words short enough to be deemed a ‘phrase’ can 
possess ‘at least some minimal degree of creativity’” as required for 
copyright protection under Feist); Johnston v. Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp., 187 P.2d 474, 482 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947) (“[A] 
person may have a property right and the right to the exclusive use 
of arbitrary or fictitious or fanciful or artificial or technical names or 
titles.”).  However, as Professors Nimmer states, “Such suggestions, 
however, must be regarded as contrary to the generally prevailing 
rule that [short words and phrases] may not claim copyright 
protection under either common law or statutory copyright 
principles.”  nImmer, supra note 25, § 2.16, at 186.
68.  37 C.F.R. 202.1(a); see Hutchins v. Zoll Med. Corp., 
492 F.3d 1377, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that “[c]opyright 
does not protect individual words and ‘fragmentary’ phrases when 
removed from their form of presentation and compilation”); CMM 
Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1519 
(1st Cir. 1996) (“It is axiomatic that copyright law denies protection 
to ‘fragmentary words and phrases’ . . . on the grounds that these 
materials do not exhibit the minimal level of creativity necessary 
to warrant copyright protection.”) (internal citations omitted); 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 289, 294 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding the song lyric “You’ve got to stand for 
something or you’ll fall for anything” uncopyrightable because the 
phrase lacked the requisite originality and did not originate with 
the song’s creators); see also Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Leadership 
Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 534 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that 
“specific words, phrases, and sentences” were not copyrightable); 
Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1072–73 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(noting that single words and short phrases in copyrighted text were 
not copyrightable).  See generally nImmer, supra note 25, § 2.01[b] 
(discussing the copyrightability of words and short phrases in the 
context of originality). 
69.  See Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 
286 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We believe that the Copyright Office’s 
longstanding practice of denying registration to short phrases merits 
deference.”); CMM Cable Rep, Inc., 97 F.3d at 1520 (“Copyright 
Office’s own interpretive regulations explicitly embrace this rule 
of non-copyrightability” of words and short phrases.); Prunte v. 
Universal Music Grp., Inc., 699 F.Supp.2d 15, 25–26, 29 (D.D.C. 
2010) (citing to Rule 202.1(a) in finding titles, words, and short 
phrases are not copyrightable); Magic Mktg., Inc. v. Mailing Servs. 
of Pittsburgh, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 769, 771–72 (W.D. Penn. 1986) 
(using Rule 202.1(a) to support the proposition that words and 
phrases do “not exhibit the minimal level of creativity necessary 
to warrant copyright protection.”); see also Kitchens of Sara Lee, 
Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1959) (finding 
that while this policy “does not have the force of statute, it is a 
fair summary of the law”).  However, in one case, the District 
of Colorado was unconvinced about the stature of the Copyright 
Office regulations, finding that they were “a rough starting point 
for an originality analysis, not a shortcut for avoiding this analysis.  
Short phrases are typically unprotectable because they are either 
insufficiently independent or insufficiently creative or both.”  
Health Grades, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.  This court’s view has 
not taken hold.
70.  11 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
“PROTECTING THE EARTH FROM THE SCUM 
OF THE UNIVERSE,” finding it unprotected by 
copyright because of the Copyright Office’s bar against 
words and short phrases.71  Thus, under the majority 
of the case law, movie quotes fall in the category of 
“short words and phrases” and, therefore, are not 
copyrightable.72
Additionally, individuals hauled into court 
to defend a copyright infringement claim have two 
defenses.  This article discusses these in the context 
of alleged infringement of short phrases from a 
larger copyrighted work.  First, the defendant can 
argue de minimis copying.  Under this theory, the 
copyright owner fails to prove that the defendant has 
taken enough of the copyrighted work to satisfy the 
required elements of substantial similarity to support 
an infringement claim.73  The second line of defense 
available is fair use.  Under fair use, a defendant’s 
otherwise infringing copying of another’s material does 
not qualify as illegal provided the defendant copied the 
material for a limited and transformative purpose.74
3. The De Minimis Defense
For a plaintiff to have a successful prima 
facie copyright infringement case, she must establish 
that the defendant has copied her work.75  Copying, 
in this context, has two components the plaintiff 
must prove: (1) that the defendant actually copied 
protected elements of her copyrighted work, and (2) 
that the defendant’s subsequent work is substantially 
similar to the original work.76  Where the copying is so 
minimal that it cannot uphold a finding of substantial 
similarity, it is considered de minimis.77  As discussed 
71.  Id. at 1185.
72.  Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. ABC Commc’ns, Inc., 
264 F.3d 622, 633 (6th Cir. 2001) (declining to extend copyright 
protection to a movie quote because it was an “insignificant part 
of a much larger work and it is a phrase or slogan not worthy of 
copyright protection in its own right”); see nImmer, supra note 25, 
§ 2.01(b), at 16–17 (referring to the majority rule that short words 
and phrases are not copyrightable).
73.  nImmer, supra note 25, § 13.03(A)(2)(a), at 58–59; see 
Connor Moran, How Much Is too Much? Copyright Protection of 
Short Portions of Text in the United States and European Union 
After Infopaq International A/S V. Danske Dagblades, 6 wAsh. 
J. L. tech. & Arts 247, 249 (2011).  This article will expand on 
substantial similarity in the larger de minimis discussion.
74.  nImmer, supra note 25, § 13.05.  This article expands 
upon what limited and transformative purpose qualify as fair use 
below.
75.  Id. § 13.01 (noting that the second element is the 
plaintiff’s ownership of the copyright in the allegedly infringed 
work).
76.  Id. § 13.01(B).
77.  Id.  As Judge Learned Hand wrote over a century ago, 
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above, copyright does not protect all elements of a 
work—like ideas or facts—but only those that contain 
a minimal level of creativity to satisfy copyright’s 
originality requirement.78  Copyright extends only to 
the expression of those unprotected elements.79
Copying similar or identical words or short 
phrases generally qualifies as de minimis and does not 
constitute infringement.80  Nevertheless, protection of 
short phrases in the infringement context has varied 
widely across different courts and cases.81  What is 
more, courts have suggested that particularly original 
or important phrases or single words from a larger 
copyrighted work might merit protection in a copyright 
infringement claim.82  These cases crucially do not find 
that these words or phrases are copyrightable—that is, 
capable of standing alone as copyrightable works 
under the Copyright Act83 apart from the larger work 
that spawned them.  These cases clearly indicate that 
short phrases could receive protection in the limited 
context of a suit for a copyright infringement action.84  
Thus, it appears that courts are willing to find short 
phrases protectable in a copyright infringement action, 
“Even where there is some copying, that fact is not conclusive 
of infringement.  Some copying is permitted.  In addition to 
copying, it must be shown that this has been done to an unfair 
extent.”  W. Publ’g Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 861 
(C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909).
78.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
345 (1991).
79.  Id.
80.  See CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 97 
F.3d 1504, 1519–20 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding no substantial similarity 
based on defendant’s use of an identical phrase to describe a radio 
call-in competition similar to plaintiff’s); Stratchborneo v. Arc 
Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1404 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (finding 
the song lyric “Got my mojo working but it just won’t work on 
you” not sufficiently unique or qualitatively significant to support a 
finding of substantial similarity).
81.  Compare Dawn Assocs. v. Links, 203 U.S.P.Q. 831, 835 
(N.D. Ill. 1978) (finding substantial similarity, and thus copyright 
infringement, in defendants’ use of the sentence, from plaintiff’s 
screenplay, “When there is no more room in hell . . . the dead will 
walk the earth” in advertising materials), with Stratchborneo, 357 
F. Supp. at 1404 (failing to find substantial similarity in defendants’ 
use of a song lyric because it was not sufficiently unique to support 
such a finding).
82.  See Heim v. Universal Pictures Corp., Inc., 154 F.2d 
480, 487 n.8 (2d Cir. 1946) (suggesting that copyright protection 
would be accorded such lines as “Euclid alone has looked on 
Beauty bare” and “Twas brillig and the slithy toves” in a copyright 
infringement action); Life Music, Inc. v. Wonderland Music Co., 
241 F. Supp. 653, 656 (S.D.N.Y.1965) (suggesting that a single 
word “SUPERCALAFRAJALISTICK-ESPEEALADOJUS” was 
“conceivably” protectable in an infringement action).
83.  As discussed above, copyrightable works must satisfy the 
statutory requirements of copyrightable subject matter—fixation 
and originality—in § 102.
84.  See nImmer, supra note 25, § 2.01(B), at 17 n.41 (“[The 
court] was not discussing copyrightability, but rather the extent of 
copying necessary to establish an infringement.”).
if the court finds that the phrases are sufficiently 
original or significant to the original work.
4. Fair Use
Fair use, unlike the de minimis defense, is 
an affirmative defense.85  Under the doctrine of fair 
use, otherwise infringing uses of a copyrighted work 
do not subject an individual—an amateur filmmaker, 
perhaps—to liability because such uses are socially 
and culturally valuable.86  The Copyright Act lists four 
factors the courts use to determine if a defendant’s use 
of a work is indeed a fair use:
 
(1) the purpose and character of the 
use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes; (2) the nature of 
the copyrighted work; (3) the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon 
the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.87
As fair use relates to movie quotes, the length of the 
alleged infringement, here a line from a long movie 
script, implicates primarily the first and third factors.  
Courts should not, however, analyze these factors 
in isolation; rather, “[a]ll are to be explored, and the 
results weighed together, in light of the purposes of 
copyright.”88
Unlike most modern movies, no two fair use 
analyses are alike.  A court’s decision depends on the 
significance it places on each factor in its analysis.89  
85.  Id. § 13.05, at 155.
86.  See Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. 
Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (“The doctrine of fair use . . . 
permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute 
when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law 
is designed to foster.”).
87.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  In an attempt to provide further 
guidance for the courts in determining whether a use is fair, the 
preamble to § 107 lists the following protected purposes: “criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research.”  
Id.  However, this is not an exhaustive list of fair use examples, so 
courts are not limited to these uses in considering what constitutes a 
protective purpose in their fair use analyses.  Bouchat v. Baltimore 
Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 301, 307–08 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 
(1985)). 
88.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 
(1994).
89.  For example, the importance courts (including the 
Supreme Court) place on the fourth factor has waxed and waned.  
See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 566 (1985) (“This last factor is undoubtedly the single most 
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Depending how a court marshals the fair use factors, 
a seemingly fair use can become decidedly infringing 
in litigation.  In other words, no one knows if a use is 
fair until a court has conducted its analysis, especially 
when “there is no amount of copying so small as to be 
presumptively fair use.”90
The discussion above illustrates the flexibility 
of the fair use analysis, but that same flexibility often 
produces unpredictable and inconsistent results.  
Indeed, fair use is a difficult doctrine for courts to 
apply.  To begin, the Copyright Act provides no 
guidance as to the relative weight a court should 
ascribe to each of the four factors.91  Additionally, 
the Copyright Act delineates each factor in only the 
most general terms,92 leaving courts with seemingly 
complete discretion in deciding whether any one factor 
is present in any specific case.93  In other words, the 
Copyright Act offers courts little guidance in rendering 
any fair use decision because it is silent on how to 
apply these nicely bundled, broadly defined, four 
factors.  As one court expressed it, the doctrine of fair 
use is “the most troublesome in the whole of copyright 
law.”94  The troublesome nature of the doctrine can 
important element of fair use.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 476 (1984) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (“[P]erhaps the most important, [is] the ‘effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.’”); 
Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 
1381, 1407 (6th Cir. 1996) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (“The fourth factor 
is the single most important element of fair use.”).  But see Castle 
Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145 
(2d Cir. 1998) (“The Supreme Court has recently retreated from its 
earlier cases suggesting that the fourth statutory factor is the most 
important element of fair use.”); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 
Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926 (2d Cir. 1994) (suggesting that the Supreme 
Court has “abandon[ed] the idea that any factor enjoys primacy 
[and] instructs that ‘[a]ll [four factors] are to be explored, and the 
results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.’”) 
(citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578).
90.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577; Moran, supra note 71, at 251. 
91.  Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 476 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting); nImmer, supra note 25, § 13.05; see 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(2006) (failing to offer any guidance on how to weigh the four 
factors put forth).
92.  nImmer, supra note 25, § 13.05; see 17 U.S.C. § 107.
93.  nImmer, supra note 25, § 13.05; see Elizabeth Dauer & 
Allison Rosen, Copyright Law and the Visual Arts: Fairey v. AP, 
8 u. denv. sPorts & ent. LAw J. 93, 103 (2010) (identifying the 
“broad discretion given trial judges in applying the four fair use 
factors”); Giselle Fahimian, How the IP Guerrillas Won: ®TMark, 
Adbusters, Negativland, and the “Bullying Back” of Creative 
Freedom and Social Commentary, 2004 stAn. tech. L. rev. 1, 39 
(2004) (identifying the application of the fair use doctrine as “often 
haphazard and arbitrary” because of the “broad discretion of courts 
with regard to the weight given to each [fair use] factor”); Joseph P. 
Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 mIch. L. rev. 409, 453 
(2002) (writing that “Congress expressly contemplated that fair use 
would remain a flexible doctrine that judges could freely adapt to 
meet changing circumstances”). 
94.  Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 
produce disconcerting results.
5. Copyright Law Principles as (Mis)
Applied by the Courts
Despite the general proposition that short 
phrases are not copyrightable, some courts have 
extended protection to these ordinarily uncopyrightable 
phrases,95 including movie quotes.  Moreover, some 
courts do so without a fair use or de minimis analysis.96  
The implication of this line of jurisprudence is 
significant for movie quotes as it represents the danger 
that courts could find a perfectly legitimate use of a 
movie quote infringes another’s copyright.
One primary example is Universal City 
Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Indus., Inc.,97 in which the court 
reviewed both trademark and copyright infringement 
claims in considering the likelihood of success on the 
merits as part of a preliminary injunction analysis.  
In Kamar, the district court concluded that the lines 
“I love you, E.T.” and “E.T. phone home!” from the 
movie E.T.: The Extra-Terrestrial, spoken by the 
eponymous E.T., were copyrightable.98
Before conducting its copyright and trademark 
infringement analyses, the court determined that 
Universal had valuable trademark rights in both the 
famous E.T. character and the name “E.T.”99  In doing 
so, the court did not expressly find that Universal had 
rights in the quotes “E.T., phone home” and “I love 
you, E.T.”100
Nevertheless, the court listed as “findings of 
fact” that Universal had established trademarks in the 
character and the name “E.T.” and that Kamar had 
likely infringed on these trademarks.  Specifically, 
the court wrote that the quotes “would be recognized 
1939) (per curiam).  See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. 417, 475 
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 
803 F.2d 1253, 1255 (2d Cir. 1986); Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. 
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 
1980); Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass’n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 
142 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. 
Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see also 4 NIMMER, supra note 
25, § 13.05.
95.  See Hughes, supra note 46, at 583–84 (describing 
Universal City Studios, Inc v. Kamar Indus., Inc, in which short 
phrases from the movie E.T.: The Extra Terrestrial were considered 
protected by copyright).
96.  Id.
97.  217 U.S.P.Q. 1162 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
98.  Id. at 1164.
99.  Id. at 1164.
100.  Id. at 1164–65.  The court describes these quotes as 
thematic tropes that drove the overarching theme of movie’s 
story.  Id. at 1165 (“These themes are consistently emphasized and 
repeated throughout the movie in the sentences “I love you, E.T.” 
and “E.T. phone home!!”).
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readily by the average lay observer as having been 
appropriated from Universal’s copyrighted motion 
picture”;101 and that Kamar’s “unauthorized use of the 
name “E.T.” on its products, and its reproduction of 
lines of dialogue from [the film] are likely to cause 
confusion as to the source of Kamar’s products.”102  
Note that the court did not characterize Kamar’s use of 
the quotes as “unauthorized” as it did the name “E.T.”
After making these factual findings, the court 
delved into its copyright analysis, stretching both 
the facts and the law to establish de facto copyright 
protection of the two famous quotes from the movie.103  
Using the average lay observer test to determine if 
Kamar’s use was copyright infringement,104 the court 
reasoned that the “E.T.” quotes on Kamar’s products 
“would be readily recognizable to the lay observer as 
key lines of dialogue from the copyrighted movie.”105  
Taking a further leap, the court concluded that Kamar 
had infringed Universal’s copyrights.106
It appears that because the court found that the 
“E.T.” name and character were Universal’s valuable 
trademarks, it did not conduct any sort of recognizable 
copyright analysis, such as a de minimis or a fair use 
analysis, but based its decision on how important the 
quotes were to the film.107  Under the court’s theory, 
if a movie quote is “readily recognizable” in terms 
of its relationship to the movie, it will be protected 
by copyright.108  Kamar’s specific application of 
copyright law, however, seems to be anomalous—the 
only case directly citing to its copyright infringement 
rationale distinguished the cases’ facts.109  Further, the 
101.  Id. at 1165.
102.  Id.
103.  Hughes, supra note 46, at 584.
104.  Kamar Indus., Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. at 1166 (articulating 
the test as “whether an average lay observer would recognize the 
alleged copy as having been appropriated from a copyrighted 
work”). 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id.
107.  See Hughes, supra note 46, at 584.  This reasoning is 
similar to the Ninth Circuit’s rationale in Cook v. Robbins, which 
so disturbed the Copyright Office.  See Cook v. Robbins, Nos. 98-
36242, 99-35141, at *3, *12 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 2000); Carson Letter 
I, supra note 60.
108.  The court’s reasoning is strikingly similar to a 
“secondary meaning” analysis in trademark law.  See supra Part 
I.B.1 (discussing secondary meaning and its significant role in 
federal trademark law).
109.  See Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. ABC Communs., 
Inc., 264 F.3d 622, 633 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Neither is the Line a 
‘readily recognizable’ portion of the Movie as were the disputed 
lines considered by the court in Universal City Studios, Inc. 
v. Kamar Industries Inc.”).  Though Kamar has not gained 
precedential value, the proposition for which it stands—a court will 
protect an uncopyrightable short phrase in an infringement action 
decision if the specific phrase is deemed important to the larger 
court’s confused conclusion likely resulted from the 
intertwined trademark/copyright analysis,110 preventing 
the case’s reasoning from gaining traction, and from 
being published in the federal reporter.111  Nevertheless, 
it does indicate that a movie quote could be protectable 
intellectual property under copyright law, though it is 
not copyrightable.
Continuing in Kamar’s trend, courts have 
found that a defendant’s use of a short textual, not 
copyrightable, excerpt in a secondary work is not a fair 
use.  Courts do so under the doctrine of qualitatively 
substantial copying, which allows courts to extend the 
short excerpt protection from infringement.112  This 
clearly pertains to movie quotes, which are short textual 
excerpts of a larger work.  The doctrine of qualitatively 
substantial copying concerns the third fair use factor, 
in which courts consider both the quantitative and 
the qualitative nature of the defendant’s use.113  In 
other words, courts examine not only the length of the 
appropriated text, but “whether [the defendant’s use 
is reasonable] in light of the purpose and character of 
the use.”114  In measuring the qualitative substantiality 
of an allegedly infringing use, the courts rely on 
work—is not anomalous.
110.  Hughes, supra note 46, at 583.
111.  In Dawn Assocs. v. Links, 203 U.S.P.Q. 831 (N.D. Ill 
1978), which preceded Kamar, the court conducted a very similar 
analysis to the court in Kamar to find both copyright and trademark 
infringement in the use of a line from the plaintiff’s screenplay and 
advertising materials.  Id. at 385.  Like in Kamar, the trademark 
and copyright issues were intertwined in the court’s analysis, and 
the court did not conduct a fair use or de minimis analysis in finding 
copyright infringement.  Id.  Further, the court did not distinguish 
the plaintiff’s screenplay—a large copyrighted work—from the 
plaintiff’s advertising—consisting of the allegedly infringed phrase 
“When there is no room left in hell . . . dead will walk the earth”—
in finding infringement.  Id.  Consequently, the decision does not 
indicate whether the court would have found infringement if only 
copyright in the screenplay were at issue.  Notably, no subsequent 
case has followed or even cited to Dawn Associates, including 
Kamar, for its copyright infringement analysis.
112.  Hughes, supra note 46, at 585–86.
113.  17 U.S.C. § 107(3).  This doctrine has existed for some 
time and is firmly established.  See Roy Exp. Co. Establishment of 
Vaduz, Liechtenstein, Black, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 503 
F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding that copying excerpts 
of less than two minutes each from four films ranging from seventy-
two to eighty-nine minutes could be found to be “qualitatively 
substantial” even if “quantitatively small”); Story v. Holcombe, 
23 F. Cas. 171, 173 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (“The infringement of a 
copyright does not depend so much upon the length of the extracts 
as upon their value.  If they embody the spirit and the force of the 
work in a few pages, they take from it that in which its chief value 
consists.”).
114.  Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of 
Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008); see 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994) 
(determining, in the context of parody, “how much more is 
reasonable will depend . . . on the extent to which the [secondary 
use’s] overriding purpose and character is to parody the original”).
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plaintiffs’ assertions of the excerpted text’s importance 
and the courts’ own subjective determinations of such 
importance.115  Consequently, as Professor Hughes 
recognized, “it is clear that [the qualitatively substantial 
doctrine] can produce de facto protection of short 
[textual] phrases.”116
The Supreme Court applied the doctrine of 
qualitatively substantial copying in Harper & Row 
Publications, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,117 finding de 
facto protection in short excerpts from a book.  Former 
President Gerald Ford had contracted with Harper & 
Row and Reader’s Digest to publish his memoirs.118  
The publishing contract gave the publishers the right 
to license prepublication excerpts.119  As the book 
neared publication, the publishers decided to exploit 
the first serial rights and entered into an exclusive 
prepublication licensing agreement with Time.120  
However, these plans were thwarted when The Nation 
sneakily acquired a copy of the Ford manuscript 
and quickly prepared a news story composed of 
paraphrases, facts, and quotes taken directly from the 
manuscript.121  Scooped by The Nation article, Time 
cancelled its piece and reneged on its contractual 
agreements with Harper & Row.122  Harper & Row 
sued The Nation for copyright infringement, and in 
response, The Nation argued fair use.123
In framing its fair use analysis, the Court 
stated, “the unpublished nature of a work is a key, 
though not necessarily determinative, factor tending 
to negate a defense of fair use.”124  The Court found 
that the first factor—the purpose of the use—weighed 
in favor of infringement, as The Nation’s “stated 
purpose [was] scooping the forthcoming hardcover 
and Time abstracts.”125  Moving onto the second factor, 
115.   See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587 (holding that the 
third factor requires courts to consider not only the quantity of 
the materials taken, but also “their quality and importance” to the 
original work); Harper & Row Publ’ns, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539, 564–65 (1985) (emphasizing that a fair use analysis 
places greater weight on the importance of the material copied than 
the amount of material copied).
116.  Hughes, supra note 46, at 587.
117.  471 U.S. 539 (1985).
118.  Id. at 542.  (noting that although this case did not deal 
with movie quotes, it provided the framework for how court would 




121.   Id. at 543.
122.  Id.
123.  Id. at 544–45.
124.  Id. at 554–55 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The 
author’s right to control the first public appearance of his first 
undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use.”). 
125.  Id. at 562.
the nature of the copied work, the Court focused on 
the unpublished status of President Ford’s memoir 
and found that this factor weighed heavily in favor of 
Harper & Row.126  However, the Court qualified its 
conclusion by stating that “substantial quotations might 
qualify as fair use in a review of a published work or a 
news account of a speech that had been delivered to the 
public or disseminated to the press.”127
The Court then addressed the third factor, the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used, and 
found that, while the amount taken by The Nation 
was quantitatively insignificant, namely 300 to 400 
words out of a 200,000-word book, “The Nation 
took ‘what was essentially the heart of the book’ . . . 
because they qualitatively embodied Ford’s distinctive 
expression.”128  Finally, the Court found that the fourth 
factor, the market effect of the defendant’s use on the 
original work, clearly weighed in favor of Harper & 
Row, because there was an actual effect on the market 
in the form of Time’s cancellation of its contracted 
serialization.129  After conducting the fair use analysis, 
the Court concluded that The Nation’s use of these 
verbatim excerpts from the unpublished manuscripts 
was not a fair use.130
In a vehement dissent, Justice Brennan 
decried that the majority’s “zealous defense of the 
copyright owner’s prerogative will . . . stifle the 
broad dissemination of ideas copyright is intended to 
nurture.”131  He argued that the Court had broadened 
copyright owners’ rights beyond traditional bounds 
by applying an “exceedingly narrow definition of the 
scope of fair use.”132
The Court’s reasoning in Harper & Row has 
been applied to subsequent fair use cases involving 
unpublished works,133 and its “heart of the work” 
126.  Id. at 563–64.
127.  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) (indicating 
that taking isolated phrases is likely a fair use and that “[s]ome 
of the briefer quotes . . . are arguably necessary . . . to convey the 
facts. . . .  But The Nation did not stop at isolated phrase and instead 
excerpted subjective descriptions and portraits of public figures.”).
128.  Id. at 564–65.
129.  Id. at 567.
130.  Id. at 569.
131.  Id. at 579 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132.  Id.  Justice Brennan also rejected the Court’s categorical 
presumption against fair use of unpublished works.  Id. at 595. 
133.  See, e.g., Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 
738 (2d Cir. 1991); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 
90, 95–99 (1987).  These courts applied almost a bright-line rule, 
refusing to find fair use where a copyrighted work was unpublished. 
However, in 1992, Congress amended § 107 to add the following: 
“The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding 
of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the 
above factors.”  17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).  Subsequently, courts 
have considered the unpublished nature of a work as but one factor 
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language has been appropriated by many courts 
in analyzing fair use134 outside of the context of 
unpublished works.  The most important factor in 
Harper & Row was the unpublished status of the 
appropriated work, not the amount of the work taken, 
and the decision’s rationale should be confined to the 
facts of the case.
The logical result of expanding the protection 
of short phrases into the realm of published works 
and movie quotes is the stifling of free expression, 
as Justice Brennan predicted.135  Nevertheless, the 
consequence of giving the doctrine of qualitative 
substantiality such great weight is that courts find short 
phrases protectable under their fair use analysis.  Under 
this doctrine, an uncopyrightable movie quote could 
defeat a claim of fair use, merely for having “quality 
and importance,” which a movie quote can undoubtedly 
develop.136
In sum, a court could find a single movie quote 
protectable, while not copyrightable, in an infringement 
action so long as the rights holder, or the court in its 
analysis, identifies it as a qualitatively important part 
of the copyrighted screenplay and story therein.  While 
this possibility of protection under copyright law would 
not arise until the rights holder initiates an infringement 
action, the power of the movie quote to protect the 
entire copyrighted work and perhaps defeat what would 
be a fair use in other circumstances exists and seems 
to be growing stronger.  This potential poses a serious 
threat to our cultural commons and to our right to free 
expression.
to consider in a fair use analysis.  See Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, 
142 F.3d 194, 204–05 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding fair use in quoting 
portions of a deceased author’s unpublished novel in scholarly 
paper).
134.  See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 587 (1994); Los Angeles News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 
9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 1997); Princeton Univ. Press v. 
Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1406 (6th Cir. 1996); 
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 
F. Supp. 1231, 1247 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
135.  Harper & Row Publ’ns, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 417 
U.S. 539, 579 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Hughes, supra 
note 46, at 586–91 (discussing the legacy of the Harper & Row 
decision).  See also Cook v. Robbins, Nos. 98-36242, 99-35141, 
14711–13 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 2000) (citing readily to Harper & Row 
and showing that the Ninth Circuit tracked the Court’s construction 
of the fair use doctrine).  
136.  See generally Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar 
Indus., Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. 1162, 1165–66 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
B. “That’s my official trademark 
catchphrase that I got from the 
Web!”137 — Trademarks
The second most logical intellectual property 
regime under which a rights holder would want to 
protect her valuable movie quote is trademark law.  
Movie quotes have already been trademarked, but only 
in connection with merchandising the movie from 
which the quote sprung, such as by placing quotes on 
mugs, T-shirts, and posters.138  This section focuses on 
the applicability of trademark law to a movie quote 
used in connection with and as a source identifier for a 
specific movie, rather than a film series.139
1. Framework of Federal Trademark Law
The Lanham Act140 provides federal protection 
for trademark holders.141  Trademarks are words, 
names, or symbols used by an entity or person “to 
137.  dIsAster movIe (Universal Studios 2008).
138.  See, e.g., THERE’S NO PLACE LIKE HOME, 
Registration No. 2,540,752 (indicating that the trademark covers 
men’s, women’s, and children’s clothing; from the movie The 
Wizard of Oz); THERE’S NO PLACE LIKE HOME, Registration 
No. 2,522,947 (highlighting that the trademark covers posters, 
books, calendars, gift-wrapping paper, and other paper goods); 
VOTE FOR PEDRO, Registration No. 3,248,228 (delineating 
that the trademark covers calendars, greeting cards, bumper 
stickers, and other paper goods; from the movie Napoleon 
Dynamite); VOTE FOR PEDRO, Registration No. 3,238,048 
(stating that the trademark only covers novelty buttons); U.S. 
Trademark Application, Serial No, 85,444,895 (filed Oct. 11, 
2011) (representing the application for THERE’S NO PLACE 
LIKE HOME in connection with mugs, bowls, plates, and other 
“earthenware goods”).  However, many applications for registration 
consisting of movie quotes in connection with move products 
have been abandoned.  See, e.g., U.S Trademark Application 
Serial No. 75,398,912 (filed Dec. 2, 1997) (abandoned Oct. 7, 
2001) (presenting the application for THERE’S NO PLACE LIKE 
HOME in connection with motion picture films); U.S. Trademark 
Application Serial No. 73,374,299 (filed Jul. 12, 1982) (abandoned 
Nov. 4, 1983) (identifying the application for E.T. in connection 
with motion picture films).
139.  In a large segment of the entertainment industry, movies 
are just one component of a larger line of merchandising, especially 
in children’s entertainment.  Think of the Harry Potter series, 
Lemony Snicket’s A Series of Unfortunate Events series, or the Star 
Wars franchise.  The quotes from movies can be an integral part of 
such a merchandising or franchising campaign, such as “Use the 
force, Luke.”  It is, indeed, intriguing to look at movie quotes in 
this context, to see if this will have any effect on the protection of 
the movie quotes.  However, the analysis will likely not change if 
solely focusing on the movie quotes.  As discussed above, quotes 
from E.T.: The Extraterrestrial received protection in such a 
merchandising context.  See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar 
Indus., Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. 1162, 1169 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
140.  15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2006).
141.  This section focuses solely on protection under this 
federal scheme.  Thus, all definitions and analyses pertain to federal 
trademark law.
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identify and distinguish his goods, including a unique 
product”142 from those produced by others and “to 
identify the source.”143  Your toothpaste, delicious 
candy bar, romance vampire novel, and aging car 
all fall under the broad category of goods.  Service 
marks,144 close cousins of trademarks, “identify and 
distinguish the services of one person . . . from the 
services of others and to indicate the source of the 
services.”145  Service marks, unlike trademarks, include 
“[t]itles, character names, and other distinctive features 
of radio or television programs.”146  For example, both 
“E.T.”—the character name—and “JIFFY LUBE” are 
service marks.147
Under the Lanham Act, sellers and producers’ 
time, energy, and advertising expenditures investments 
are protected from others who may subsequently use 
the rights holder’s mark on their products.148  Thus, the 
purpose of trademark law is twofold: (1) to prevent 
consumer confusion over the source of goods or 
services and (2) to enable producers to differentiate 
their products from others on the market.149  Because 
they are used to identify the source of products, 
trademarks are “a very peculiar kind of property 
[because, unlike copyrights, trademarks have] no 
existence apart from the goodwill of the product or 
service it symbolizes.”150
The primary means to secure protection under 
the Lanham Act requires a mark holder to also establish 
142.  15 U.S.C. § 1127.
143.  Id.
144.  This article will refer to these marks as “trademarks” 
and “service marks” when discussing one individually.  When 
discussing both, this article uses the term “marks.”
145.  15 U.S.C. § 1127.
146.  Id.
147.  See, e.g., E.T., Registration No. 1,314,514; JIFFY LUBE, 
Registration No. 1,384,672.
148.  1 J. thomAs mccArthY, mccArthY on trAdemArks 
And unFAIr comPetItIon, § 2:30 (4th ed. 1996); Lauren P. Smith, 
Trademarks to the Movies: “An Af-‘Fair Use’ to Remember”, 48 
cLev. st. L. rev. 415, 418 (2000).  However, “[a] large expenditure 
of money does not in itself create legally protectable rights.”  Smith 
v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir. 1968); see Fleetwood 
Co. v. Mende, 298 F.2d 797, 799 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (stating that a 
“vast amount of money [invested] in advertising [a] product by [a] 
trademark” does not, without more, give rise to a legally protectable 
right).
149.  As Congress wrote, the Lanham Act was intended to 
make “actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks” 
and “to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair 
competition.”  15 U.S.C. § 1127; see M. B. H. Enters, Inc. v. 
WOKY, Inc., 633 F.2d 50, 54 (7th Cir. 1980) (“A trade or service 
[mark’s] . . . purpose . . . is to separate those goods or services 
from others in the public consciousness, to identify them as the 
product of a single source, and to represent them in the mind of the 
public.”).
150.  mccArthY, supra note 144, at § 2:15, at 39–40.
bona fide use of the mark in commerce.151  Bona fide 
use of a mark in commerce means a bona fide sale or 
transport of goods and bona fide display of the mark 
in the sale or advertisement for services rendered in 
commerce.  In the context of federal trademark law, 
commerce includes all commercial activity “which may 
lawfully be regulated by Congress.”152  To maintain, 
and prove, ownership of mark an owner must establish 
(1) that it used the mark sometime in the past and (2) 
that its use of the mark continues into the present.153  
This is known as the “continuous use requirement.”  To 
satisfy the continuous use requirement under trademark 
law, this use must be of something more than a 
sporadic nature.154 
Once an owner has a mark, the strength of that 
mark determines how much protection it receives in 
the courts.  Courts have identified a spectrum of marks 
under which to gauge a mark’s “eligibility to trademark 
status and the degree of protection accorded.”155  
The spectrum, in ascending order of protection, is: 
(1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, and (4) 
arbitrary or fanciful.156  A generic mark is the name of 
the product or service itself—for instance, the mark 
TERRIFYING HORROR MOVIE SERIES for use in 
connection with a super-scary horror movie series such 
as Saw.157  Generic terms can never function as marks 
to indicate the origin of goods or services.158
Descriptive terms are those that communicate 
information about specific characteristics or qualities 
of a good or service—for example, 5-MINUTE 
for glue that sets in five minutes.159  These terms 
can serve as protectable marks only if they acquire 
151.  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (requiring use in commerce for marks); 
see 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (requiring bona fide use in commerce to 
federally register a mark).
152.  15 U.S.C. § 1127.
153.  mccArthY, supra note 144, § 16:9; see D. & M. Antique 
Imp. Corp. v. Royal Saxe Corp., 311 F. Supp. 1261, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969) (“As property rights subject to ‘ownership,’ trademarks are 
sui generis . . . .  Ownership grows out of and depends upon the 
continuance of use.”). 
154.  mccArthY, supra note 144, § 16:9; see Dep’t of Parks & 
Recreation for C.A. v. Bazaar Del Mundo, Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1126 
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a party “cannot rely on a few instances 
of use of the marks in the distant past that were ‘casual’ or had 
‘little importance apparently attached to [them]’”).
155.  Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 
F.2d 4, 9 (2nd Cir. 1976).
156.  Id.
157.  Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 
189, 194 (1985) (“A generic term is one that refers to the genus of 
which the particular product is a species.”).
158.  Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9–10; mccArthY, supra note 
144, § 12:1.
159.  mccArthY, supra note 144, § 11:16.
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secondary meaning.160  Secondary meaning refers to the 
consumers’ association of a mark with the source—the 
seller, manufacturer, or service provider—and not with 
the product or service to which the mark attaches.161  
Thus, even though a term is descriptive, it can serve 
as a protectable trademark if consumers associate the 
mark with the source, such as FIVE HOUR ENERGY.
Unlike descriptive marks, suggestive marks 
do not require secondary meaning.  Aptly named, a 
suggestive mark does not describe a product’s features, 
but suggests them.162  CHICKEN OF THE SEA163 
for canned tuna represents a prominent example of 
this distinction.  Because suggestive marks require 
“imagination, thought, and perception to arrive at 
the qualities or characteristics of the goods,” they do 
not require proof of secondary meaning to receive 
trademark protection.164
Fanciful marks are “coined” words or phrases 
that are created solely to function as marks,165 such 
as KODAK photographic supplies.  Similar to 
fanciful marks, arbitrary marks are those “in which 
an otherwise common word is used in an unfamiliar 
way.” 166 Perhaps the most famous example of this 
is APPLE for computer and phone products.  Both 
fanciful and arbitrary marks, like suggestive marks, are 
considered “inherently distinctive” and are protectable 
without secondary meaning.167  Even if a mark receives 
trademark protection as discussed above, a mark loses 
protection for the holder’s failure to use the mark in 
commerce168 or from becoming generic.169
Under a strict reading of the Lanham Act, a 
movie quote used in connection with a single movie 
160.  In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 
2001).  The Lanham Act uses the term “acquired distinctiveness” in 
lieu of “secondary meaning.”  15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006).
161.  See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 
820 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[S]econdary meaning is a mental recognition 
in buyers’ and potential buyers’ minds that products connected with 
the symbol or device emanate from or are associated with the same 
source.”).
162.  Zobmondo Entm’t, LLC v. Falls Media, LLC, 602 F.3d 
1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. 
E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1047 n.8 (9th Cir. 1998)).
163.  See CHICKEN OF THE SEA, Registration No. 0097192.
164.  In re Nett Designs, 236 F.3d at 1341; see Zobomondo 
Entm’t, LLC, 602 F.3d at 1114 (defining a suggestive mark as 
one for which “a consumer must use imagination or any type 
of multistage reasoning to understand the mark’s significance”) 
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
165.  Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 
137, 143 (2d Cir. 1997).
166.  Lever Bros. Co. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 693 F.2d 251, 256 
(2d Cir. 1982).
167.  mccArthY, supra note 144, § 11:4.
168.  Id. § 17:9.
169.  Id. § 12:26.
would not fit into the definition of a service mark, 
and thus a broad reading of the Lanham Act renders a 
diverging reading.  A movie quote used in connection 
with a single movie could not serve as a service mark.  
Our hypothetical service mark holder is not using it 
in connection with series of films, nor is the movie 
quote a “distinctive feature” of a radio or television 
program170 or an analogous feature, like a newspaper 
column title.171  The quote is a short extract taken from 
the larger work, the script, which is a unique literary 
production, unlike serial publications or broadcasts, 
which provide a regular service such as music, news, 
entertainment, etc.  Neither a movie nor the movie 
script is a service; each is a singular artistic product.
However, under this same strict reading of the 
Lanham Act, a movie quote could serve theoretically as 
a trademark under the act if the quote were to acquire 
secondary meaning.172  Accordingly, a movie quote 
would be a descriptive mark, requiring secondary 
meaning to serve as a trademark.173  First, the movie 
itself is a “good.”174  In the United States, the motion 
picture industry generates a significant portion of the 
country’s gross domestic product through box office 
sales.175  Further, individuals do associate specific 
movie quotes with their movies of origin, such as how 
“Say hello to my little friend” conjures up Scarface.176  
Consequently, these quotes arguably could be protected 
under the Lanham Act.177  However, further reflection 
170.  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
171.  See Metro Publ’g, Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury News, 987 
F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding a newspaper column name 
consistent with the Lanham Act’s definition of trademark “because 
it serves to identify the column as the product of a particular 
writer or paper and to distinguish it from surrounding copy and the 
features of competing publications”).
172.  This would be similar to the theory of literary titles 
serving as trademarks upon the acquisition of secondary meaning, 
as discussed below.  See Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., v. Majestic 
Pictures Corp., 70 F.2d 310, 311 (2d Cir. 1934) (explaining how a 
literary title can acquire secondary meaning).
173.   See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 
537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 1976).
174.  See William S. Hendon & Anna M. Starvaggi, Using 
the Nonprofit Arts in the Growth of Trade?, 22 J. Arts mgmt. L 
& soc’Y 155, 155 (1992) (classifying movies as “artistic cultural 
goods”); see also sIwek, supra note 3, at i-ii (including movies in 
the category of “knowledge-intensive intellectual property-based 
goods”).
175.  See sIwek, supra note 3, at 6; motIon PIcture 
AssocIAtIon oF AmerIcA, supra note 3; u.s. census BureAu, supra 
note 3, at 767 tbl.1229 (demonstrating that motion pictures are a 
growing aspect of the U.S. economy).
176.  A search of the Internet for “movie quotes” yields 
thousands of Web sites dedicated to movie quotes.  Search the title 
of your favorite film and “movie quotes,” and you will find several 
Web sites collecting the most memorable quotes from films such as 
Donnie Darko or The Maltese Falcon.
177.  See Warner Bros. Pictures, 70 F.2d at 311.
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and a review of the case law demonstrates the fallacy 
of that contention.
2. Law of Literary Titles Theory 
Underlying Cases Involving Literary 
Works
To determine the protection of movie quotes, 
trademark law’s treatment of titles is illustrative.  
Similar to the Copyright Office, the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) will not register 
titles for single, or individual literary, works.178  
However, the Lanham Act protects the title of an 
individual literary work in an infringement action, 
specifically false advertising and/or false designations 
of origin,179 even though the quote is not registrable as 
a trademark. 
Despite their artistic and literary nature, 
movies, plays, and books are commercial products sold 
in the marketplace.180  As the Second Circuit explained:
 
[t]he purchaser of a book, like the 
purchaser of a can of peas has a right 
not to be misled as to the source of the 
product.  Thus, it is well established 
that where the title of a movie or a book 
has acquired secondary meaning—that 
is, where the title is sufficiently well 
known that consumers associate it with 
178.  Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) 
§ 1202.08 (6th ed. 2010); see Application of Cooper, 254 F.2d 
611, 613 (C.C.P.A. 1958).  However, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) will register the title of a series comprised 
of several works—i.e., Harry Potter series.  TMEP § 1202.08(d).  
PTO will also register magazine/newspaper column titles.  See 
discussion supra note 167 and accompanying text (establishing that 
newspaper column titles can be protected); Metro Publ’g, 987 F.2d 
at 640–41.  However, because this article addresses a movie quote 
used as a trademark in connection with a single movie and not a 
series, such registration shall not be discussed further.
179.  Specifically, § 43(a) of the Lanham Act makes liable in a 
civil action:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or 
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, 
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any 
false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, 
or false or misleading representation of fact, which--
      (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or 
to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such 
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or 
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by 
another person, or
      (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents 
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or 
her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities.
15 U.S.C. § 1025(a).
180.  Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997 (2d Cir. 1989).
a particular author’s work—the holder 
of rights to that title may prevent the 
use of the same or confusingly similar 
titles by other authors.181
Accordingly, a movie title can serve as a trademark if it 
acquires secondary meaning.
A literary title acquires secondary meaning 
through consumers’ association of the title with a 
single source of the literary work.182  This association 
can be with one anonymous source183—“[t]hat is, the 
consumer need not know the trade name of the source, 
but is entitled to assume that all works or goods under 
that title are controlled by some single source.”184  The 
author of the work may serve as the single source, but a 
reasonable guideline is that the consumers’ association 
can be with the owner of the copyright in the literary 
work, as that entity, or person, controls the work’s 
use.185  Thus, a production company or publisher can 
serve as the source, even though consumers do not 
know the entity’s name.  For example, which “Vote 
for Pedro” quoting consumers know that Twentieth 
Century Fox produced Napoleon Dynamite?
Literary titles will receive narrow protection 
in infringement suits under specific circumstances.  
As the court articulated in the influential case Rogers 
v. Grimaldi,186 the “overextension of Lanham Act 
restrictions in the area of titles might intrude on First 
Amendment values.”187  Consequently, to determine 
if a title merits trademark protection, courts balance 
the right of the trademark owner to prevent confusion 
against the free speech rights of the creator of the 
allegedly infringing literary work.188
Thus, as established in what is referred to 
181.  Id. at 997–98. 
182.  See Warner Bros. Pictures, 70 F.2d at 311; see Tri-Star 
Pictures, Inc. v. Unger, 14 F. Supp. 2d 339, 348 (S.D. N.Y. 1998) 
(“[M]otion picture titles acquire secondary meaning when the title 
becomes so well known that consumers associate it with a particular 
author’s work.”).
183.  Jackson v. Universal Int’l Pictures, 222 P.2d 433, 438 
(Cal. 1950).  (“There is no logical basis for holding that a public 
well acquainted with the title and the play could not confer 
secondary meaning upon that title merely because of unfamiliarity 
with the author’s name.”).
184.  mccArthY, supra note 144, § 10:10, at 30.
185.  Id.; see Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 
U.S. 23, 36 (2003) (concluding that the source of goods “refers to 
the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not 
to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in 
those goods”); Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Manns Theatres, 195 
U.S.P.Q. 159 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
186.  875 F.2d 994, 997–98 (2d Cir. 1989).
187.  Id. at 999.
188.  Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., 
Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989).
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as the Rogers test, a title will not receive protection 
under the Lanham Act unless the title has “no artistic 
relevance to the underlying work [e.g., the movie] or, if 
it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly 
misleads as to source or content of work.”189  For 
example, in Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday 
Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc.,190 the court found that a 
parody of the Cliffs Notes books, “Spy Notes” did 
not infringe on the “Cliffs Notes” trademark.191  The 
court concluded that although the parody cover of Spy 
Notes conjured up the original and even used some of 
the same colors and features of the original design, the 
public interest in free expression outweighed the small 
chance of consumer confusion it posed, especially 
because parody requires mimicry of the original.192
Movie quotes may be able to function as 
trademarks for a single movie in light the law of 
literary titles.  One might immediately conclude that 
movie quotes are more apt to serve as trademarks 
than movie titles.  Unlike movie titles, movie quotes’ 
primary function in relation to a literary work is not 
to identify and describe the work, in this case the 
movie.193  Movie quotes are less inherently descriptive 
than movie titles because movie quotes are not “labels” 
designed to describe the literary work with which they 
are associated, as are titles.194  As singular pieces of 
the script taken out of context, movie quotes serve to 
develop the character, propel the plot, and perhaps 
catch on with the public.  However, writers and 
production companies do not create a movie quote to 
serve as the movie’s identifier.  It seems that this fact 
189.  Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).  
In looking to the artistic relevance at issue, the Rogers court held 
that “the title ‘Ginger and Fred’ surpassed the minimum threshold 
of artistic relevance to the film’s content” for two reasons.  Id.  
“The central characters in the film are nicknamed ‘Ginger’ and 
‘Fred,’ and these names are not arbitrarily chosen just to exploit 
the publicity value of their real life counterparts but instead have 
genuine relevance to the film’s story.”  Id.  Though the Rogers test 
originated in circumstances where a celebrity’s name was used in a 
title, the courts have expanded the test to pertain to all literary titles. 
See Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 495.
190.  886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989).
191.  Id.
192.  Id. at 497.
193.  See Application of Cooper, 254 F.2d 611, 614–15 
(C.C.P.A. 1958) (denying protection for descriptive book names).  
This is true unless the quote is the same as the title, such as the line 
“Dude, where’s my car?” from the film Dude, Where’s My Car?
194.  It is well established that movie titles can acquire 
secondary meaning sufficient to overcome their “descriptive” 
status.  See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997; supra notes 183–86 and 
accompanying text.  Like movie titles, movie quotes can acquire 
secondary meaning, in that viewers—the consumers—associate a 
certain quote with a specific movie.  “Yeah, Baby!” has come to 
signify Austin Powers, just as “Say hello to my little friend” brings 
to mind Scarface.
should not preclude a rights holder from putting the 
movie quote to use as a trademark.
Though this has not been tested in court, a 
movie quote could legitimately serve as a trademark 
in connection with a single movie under the logic of 
the case law establishing trademark rights in literary 
titles.195  By making this conclusion, this article does 
not mean that it would be a registrable trademark, 
but that courts would afford it protection under the 
Lanham Act in an infringement action.  First, courts 
have historically protected the titles of single literary 
works under the Lanham Act in infringement actions.196 
Therefore, the fact that the quote serves to identify 
the source of a single movie should not be a bar to 
protection.  Additionally, that consumers will likely 
not associate the movie quote with the production 
company, or designated rights holder, does not bar 
protection.  As in the law of titles, consumers need only 
assume that the movie is controlled by some single 
source.197
Finally, under the Rogers test, movie quotes 
are artistically relevant to the movie because movie 
quotes are an essential expressive part of the movie.198  
This is likely why our Mr. Buffer bemoaned the fact 
that no one capitalized on “Show me the money” from 
Jerry Maguire: The quote was a central part of the 
plot, character development, and expressive nature 
of the film.  Accordingly, a movie quote, if used as a 
trademark in connection with a single movie, would 
likely receive protection under the Lanham Act in an 
infringement action.199
195.  This assumes that the quote is put to use as a trademark, 
of course.  That is, it “perform[s] the job of identification: to 
identify one source and distinguish it from other sources.”  
mccArthY, supra note 144, § 3:3, at 6.
196.  See, e.g., Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v. Unger, 14 F. Supp. 2d 
339, 347–48 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that the section of Lanham 
Act prohibiting false designation of origin includes movie titles).
197.  See mccArthY, supra note 144, § 10:10.
198.  See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(emphasizing the importance of the artistic relevance of the title).
199.  The Lanham Act, however, provides trademark holders, 
including corporate entities with a means of protection similar to 
the right of publicity—an action for trademark dilution.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c) (2006).  Trademark dilution is the weakening of a mark’s 
ability to distinguish clearly a single source.  mccArthY, supra note 
144, § 24:67.  There are two types of dilution, namely “blurring” 
and “tarnishment.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).  Dilution by “blurring” 
is where the majority of the legal action is, whereas tarnishment is 
quite rare.  See mccArthY, supra note 144, at § 24:67.  Blurring 
occurs when the use of another’s mark creates “the possibility that 
the mark will lose its ability to serve as a unique identifier of the 
plaintiff’s product.”  Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 
805 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 
F.3d 1316, 1326 n.7 (9th Cir. 1998)).  Tarnishment, however, occurs 
“when a famous mark is improperly associated with an inferior or 
offensive product or service.”  Id.  To file for trademark dilution or 
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Nevertheless, the long-term value of investing 
in a movie quote trademark is likely questionable.  The 
movie quote trademark, if the movie quote catches on 
with the public so that the quote is used without any 
connection to the film, might not last very long.  In 
other words, the mark could be deemed abandoned200 
by a court if the quote became so part of the cultural 
lexicon201 that it dissociates itself from the movie 
and becomes generic, without any relation to the 
film that spawned it.202  If a movie quote becomes so 
ubiquitous as to become a cultural reference, such as 
“I’m as mad as hell, and I’m not going to take this 
anymore!”,203 rather than a source identifier, such as to 
the amazing 1976 film Network, a court would likely 
find that the production company has abandoned the 
mark and lost all associated trademark rights.204  As 
Professor Nimmer noted, “[s]uch a result is sometimes 
characterized as ‘abandonment,’ although the semantic 
usage of consumers may be entirely beyond the control 
of the trademark owner.”205  So, while a movie quote 
trademark may be protectable, it might not be the 
wisest investment.
tarnishment in this article’s context, a movie studio would need to 
have a valid movie-quote trademark, which, as we discussed above, 
is highly unlikely.
200.  Under the Lanham Act, a mark is deemed abandoned 
when either:
(1) [I]ts use has been discontinued with intent not to resume 
such use. Intent not to resume may be inferred from circumstances.  
Nonuse for 3 consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of 
abandonment[;] [or] 
(2) [A]ny course of conduct of the owner, including acts of 
omission as well as commission, causes the mark to become 
the generic name for the goods or services on or in connection 
with which it is used or otherwise to lose its significance as a 
mark.  Purchaser motivation shall not be a test for determining 
abandonment under this paragraph.
15 U.S.C. § 1127.
201.  See Levy, supra note 17 (“These phrases have gotten 
so deep into the language they’re being used by people who don’t 
know the origin. . . .  They have left the arena of film into the 
popular culture.”); see also Ed Susman, Favorite Movie Quotes 
Transcend Ages, unIted Press InternAtIonAL, scIence news, Aug. 
7, 2000 (“Many quotes come from movies that the people never 
saw.”).
202.  mccArthY, supra note 144, § 17:8.  An in-depth analysis 
of this argument is beyond the scope of this article.  However, 
proving that a movie quote mark was abandoned would likely be 
difficult for several reasons, one of which being that the public 
likely associates a well-known quote with the movie in which it 
appears—i.e., “Show me the money” comes from Jerry Maguire.  
Nevertheless, the burden of proving that the mark, or quote, 
has been abandoned in litigation would likely rest on the party 
alleging abandonment.  See 15 U.S.C. § 11,064(3) (allowing a 
party to petition to cancel a mark on the grounds that it has been 
abandoned).
203.  network (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1976).
204.  See mccArthY, supra note 144, § 17:8.
205.  Id.
3. Law of Slogans
 If a production company is planning a 
massive advertising campaign for a soon-to-be-
released movie, it might consider using a slogan to 
support said campaign.  Could this slogan be a movie 
quote?  Certainly, the quote “I’m kind of a big deal” 
would have served as an effectively hilarious, and 
appropriate, slogan for Anchorman: The Legend of Ron 
Burgundy.206  It would have been a creative, amusing 
way to communicate to potential viewers that they 
should see the movie—it is a big deal.  Despite this 
valuable proposition, a movie quote is not a protectable 
trademark under the law governing slogans.  We have 
all heard slogans, and sometimes even get sick of them. 
A slogan is a “catch phrase” used in an advertising 
campaign207 that “accompanies other marks such as 
house marks and product line marks.”208  As such, a 
“slogan” is intended to remind the consumer of the 
brand.209
Under the established case law, a movie quote 
could not acquire trademark protection as a slogan for a 
single movie title.  First, a movie quote is not a brand.  
The quote is simply part of the product (the movie) that 
is being trademarked, not an actual trademark for the 
entire product.  Therefore, a movie quote cannot get 
over the threshold requirement of use in connection 
with a brand.210
Further, a movie quote would not receive 
protection as a slogan because common phrases 
cannot obtain trademark protection under the Lanham 
Act, as the public will not identify it with just one 
source of goods.211  Most movie quotes that could be 
potential slogans are common phrases or slang and 
206.  AnchormAn: the Legend oF ron BurgundY 
(DreamWorks Pictures 2004).
207.  Michael F. Aylward, Covering Your Tracks: Will There 
Be Insurance Coverage for False Marking Claims?, 3 LAndsLIde 
19, 22 (2011).
208.  mccArthY, supra note 144, § 7:19, at 45.
209.  Hugo Boss Fashions, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 
608, 619 (2d Cir. 2001).  A brand is “[a] name or symbol used by a 
seller . . . to identify goods or services and to distinguish them from 
competitors’ goods or services.”  BLAck’s LAw dIctIonArY 213 (9th 
ed. 2009).
210.  Even if a movie title were a brand, words used as 
taglines to for distinctive brands are generally not protectable under 
trademark law.  Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 
2002).
211.  M.B.H. Enters, Inc. v. WOKY, Inc., 633 F.2d 50, 54 
(7th Cir. 1980); B & L Sales Assocs. v. H. Daroff & Sons, Inc., 
421 F.2d 352, 354 (2d Cir. 1970); see mccArthY, supra note 144, 
§ 7:22 (“[T]he ordinary consumer would not take such ordinary 
advertising phrases to identify a single source.”).  PTO will not 
register common phrases and slogans.  In re Boston Beer Co., 47 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1914 (T.T.A.B. 1998).
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would thereby be precluded from serving as slogans.  
A search on Google returns over sixty thousand hits 
for “I’m kind of a big deal.”  This probably makes the 
movie quote a common phrase, but it could receive 
protection as a slogan under the Lanham act if it 
acquires secondary meaning.  While this is possible, 
it is a quite a feat to do so.  How do you acquire 
secondary meaning in a phrase that is so ubiquitous in 
the public lexicon?  For a commonly used movie quote 
to acquire secondary meaning, the would-be trademark 
owner would have to advertise to such an extent that 
the public would associate only one company with 
the common phrase where several other competing 
companies may be advertising with the identical 
language.212  That would be difficult, indeed.
Similarly, a movie quote would likely be 
considered a descriptive phrase that “impart[s] 
information” regarding the movie’s content, thus 
depriving it of trademark status.213  “I’m kind of a big 
deal” communicates Ron Burgundy, the eponymous 
Anchorman, with arrogance and lack of self-awareness 
that is central to his character and to the film.  Thus, a 
court could reasonably consider the phrase as merely 
describing the movie’s content.
Finally, a movie quote would not be able to 
serve as a slogan because, as we have established 
above, a movie quote cannot be a legitimate trademark 
for a single movie in most circumstances.  Under 
trademark law, a “‘slogan’ must be something, other 
than the house mark or product mark itself, that 
provides such a reminder.”214  A house mark “is a mark 
used on several different goods or services which 
themselves use a particular ‘product mark.’”215  For 
example, “Apple” is a house mark, whereas “iPhone” 
and “iPad” are product marks.  In the context of movie 
quotes serving as marks for specific movies, the movie 
or the movie title would have to be the house mark, 
whereas the movie quote would have to be the product 
mark.  However, the movie is a single good—to 
be a house mark, the mark must be used on several 
different goods.  Thus, the movie cannot serve as its 
own house mark.  Even though a movie quote cannot 
serve as a slogan, remember that it can likely receive 
protection as a trademark under the Lanham Act in 
an infringement action.216  But can a movie quote get 
protection under the right of publicity?
212.  mccArthY, supra note 144, § 7:23.
213.  Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 641 (7th 
Cir. 2001).
214.  Hugo Boss Fashions, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 
608, 619 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original).
215.  mccArthY, supra note 144, § 23:43, at 217–18.
216.  See supra Part 1.B.2.a.
C. “It’s just publicity.  It helps 
everyone”217— Rights of Publicity
This article analyzes right of publicity in 
a movie quote not in connection with an actor, a 
producer/director, or even a character, but in connection 
with a specific movie itself.  The right of publicity 
has its origins in the right to privacy.218  The Second 
Circuit firmly established in Haelen Laboratories, Inc. 
v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.219 the right to publicity 
when it held that “in addition to and independent 
of that right of privacy, . . . a man has a right in the 
publicity value of his photograph.”220  Initially, the 
right of publicity was limited to the right of a person 
to control the commercial use of his or her identity.221  
It has since expanded to cover an individual’s “name, 
likeness, or other indicia of identity”222 and has become 
an independent doctrine distinct from the right of 
privacy.223  It is a legal right “inherent to everyone to 
control the commercial use of identity and persona” 
and to make actionable any unpermitted taking.224  
The right of publicity is based in state law.225  It is 
217.  the runAwAYs (River Road Entertainment 2010).
218.  Gil Peles, The Right of Publicity Gone Wild, 11 ucLA 
ent. L. rev. 301, 304 (2004); see Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. 
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 hArv. L. rev. 193, 196 (1890).
219.  202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
220.  Id. at 868.  The court stated that this “right might be 
called a ‘right of publicity.’”
221.  Peles, supra note 211, at 304.
222.  restAtement (thIrd) oF unFAIr comPetItIon § 46 (1995). 
223.  See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 
1992) (noting the right to publicity in voice); Carson v. Here’s 
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(establishing Carson’s right to publicity in catchphrase “Here’s 
Johnny”).
224.  1 J. thomAs mccArthY, the rIghts oF PuBLIcItY And 
PrIvAcY § 1.3 (2th ed. 2012).
225.  At least nineteen states have statutes that confer a 
right to publicity or analogous rights on its citizens.  See, e.g., 
cAL. cIv. code §§ 3344–3344.1 (West 1969) (disallowing the 
unauthorized commercial or advertising use of name, voice, 
signature, photograph or likeness); n.Y. cIv. rIghts LAw §§ 50, 
51 (McKinney 1995) (prohibiting the unauthorized use for 
advertising or trade purposes, of the name, portrait or picture of 
any living person); 42 PA. cons. stAt. § 8316 (2002) (prohibiting 
the unauthorized use of name or likeness); tex. ProP. code Ann. 
§ 26.001–.015 (West 1987) (prohibiting the unauthorized use of 
a deceased individual’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or 
likeness in any manner, including commercial and advertising 
uses); utAh code Ann. § 45-3-1–45-3-6 (LexisNexis 1999) 
(disallowing unauthorized commercial use of an individual’s 
personal identity in a way that implies approval or endorsement 
of a product or subject matter); wAsh. rev. code § 63.60.010 et 
seq. (1998) (recognizing that every individual or personality has a 
property right in the use of his name, voice, signature, photograph 
or likeness), held unconstitutional by Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. 
v. HendrixLicensing.com, LTD, 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 
2011).
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also codified in the Lanham Act226 and articulated in 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.227
Since it was first established in Topps Chewing 
Gum, the right of publicity has expanded greatly to 
cover a person’s likeness,228 voice,229 catchphrase,230 
or distinctive object231 that identify a person.  Despite 
this expansion, his right has not expanded beyond 
the realm of human beings—non-human entities like 
corporations or organizations cannot claim a right of 
publicity.232  It appears that the courts have not heeded 
Professor Nimmer’s encouragement of the extension 
of publicity rights beyond humans: “Since animals, 
inanimate objects, and business and other institutions 
all may be endowed with publicity values, the human 
owners of these non-human entities should have a 
right of publicity (although no right of privacy) in 
such property.”233  Indeed, as the law stands, courts 
recognize a right to publicity only in humans.
226.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
227.  restAtement, supra note 215, § 46.
228.  White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (finding that use of a blonde-wig-and-dress-donning 
robot turning letters on a game show set violated Vanna White’s 
right of publicity).
229.  Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 
1992) (finding use of a Tom Waits “sound alike” in a snack food 
commercial violated Waits’s right of publicity); Midler v. Ford 
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the use of 
a Bette Midler “sound alike” singer in automotive advertising 
violated Midler’s right of publicity).
230.  Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 
F.2d 831 (finding the use of Johnny Carson’s catch phrase “Here’s 
Johnny” in connection with portable toilets violated Carson’s right 
of publicity because the public identified him with that phrase).
231.  Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 
821 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the use of likeness of a race car 
driver’s race car in an advertisement, even though viewers could not 
see the driver’s image, violated his right of publicity because the 
public would identify the driver from the car).
232.  Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 583, 594 (Ind. 
2001) (following the “overwhelming majority of other states” that 
have held a corporation has not right of privacy); Univ. of Notre 
Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 22 A.2d 452, 
455 (N.Y.S. 1965) (finding that a university is not a “living person” 
under the New York statute); Schubert v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 
189 Misc. 734, 742 (N.Y.S. 1947) (finding that a corporation is not 
a “living person” under New York publicity law); mccArthY, supra 
note 217, § 4:39, at 268.  The farthest case law has extended the 
right of publicity beyond humans is to recognize a right of publicity 
in a music group.  See Apple Corps. v. A.D.P.R., Inc., 843 F. 
Supp. 342, 348 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (finding that “The Beatles” was 
protected under the Tennessee statute as an “individual”); Brockum 
Co. v. Blaylock, 729 F. Supp. 438, 466 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (recognizing 
a right of publicity in “The Rolling Stones”).
233.  Melville Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & 
contemP. ProBs. 203, 216 (1954).
1. Application of Law of Rights of 
Publicity to Movie Quotes
 For a movie quote to be protected under a right 
of publicity, the movie itself would have to have a right 
to publicity.  This is untenable under established case 
law—and common sense—as the right to publicity 
covers only natural persons.234  Courts have rejected 
extending the right of publicity to non-human entities 
that are composed of people, such as organizations 
and corporations, so courts are certainly not poised to 
recognize a right of publicity in an entirely inanimate 
object such as a movie.  The thrust of this reasoning 
is that recognizing a right of publicity in movies, 
rather than in the actors therein, would distort the right 
beyond its original purposes.235  If movies do not have a 
right to privacy, just like organizations and corporations 
do not have a right of privacy under state statutes, then 
movies should not have a right of publicity.  Indeed, to 
extend a right of publicity to movies would be absurd 
since it would effectively allow a movie to enforce 
the same rights that individuals have.  This absurdity 
becomes abundantly clear when you consider that no 
court has accepted Nimmer’s invitation to extend the 
right of publicity to more understandable situations—
for example, to animals or corporations.236
II. “PerhAPs You thInk You’re    
BeIng treAted unFAIrLY?”237 — whY   
movIe Quotes shouLd receIve   
LImIted ProtectIon
 As illustrated above, movie quotes are likely 
protectable to a limited extent under copyright and 
trademark law in infringement actions.  This is 
understandable because movie quotes are valuable 
and the rights holders should have the ability to 
capitalize on this value.  However, this extension of 
234.  See, e.g., FLA. stAt. § 540.08 (1967) (noting that the 
statute covers a “natural person”); nev. rev. stAt. § 597.810 
(explaining that the statute covers a “natural person”); n.Y. cIv. 
rIghts LAw § 50 (McKinney 1995) (highlighting that the statute 
covers a “living person”); tenn. code Ann. § 47-25-1102 (1984) 
(stating that the statute applies to a “human being”); Pump, Inc. v. 
Collins Mgmt., Inc., 746 F. Supp. 1159 (D. Mass. 1990) (expressing 
doubt that the Massachusetts statute covers commercial names or 
trademarks); Eagle’s Eye, Inc. v. Ambler Fashion Shop, Inc., 627 F. 
Supp. 856 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that the right of publicity does 
not protect trademarks).
235.  See mccArthY, supra note 217, § 4:39 (“The danger 
comes from expanding the right of publicity beyond its reason for 
being.”).
236.  See Nimmer, supra note 226, at 216.
237.  stAr wArs: ePIsode v: the emPIre strIkes BAck 
(Lucasfilm 1980).
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protection, and the means with which rights holders 
can mine the gold from their movie quotes, should 
be narrow, balancing the interests of the rights 
holder with the public interest in free expression and 
cultural development.238  Cultural development does 
not necessarily correspond with sophistication or 
artistry.  “Toga!  Toga!” is not a highbrow expression 
of American existentialism or an articulation of the 
downfall of our educational system, but it holds 
an important place in our cultural heritage—it is 
Americana 101, if you will.
Copyright and trademark protection should 
be extremely limited in their application here because 
movie quotes exist as part of our cultural commons.  
Our society has incorporated these lines into our 
cultural lexicon.  Movie lines, trademarks, and famous 
characters all become parts of our culture, and we 
use them as a means of communication.239  “We’re 
not in Kansas anymore” no longer references only 
The Wizard of Oz, but means, “we are out of our 
comfort zone.”  “We’re not in Kansas anymore” has 
transcended the initial meaning it had when Dorothy, 
played by Judy Garland, uttered the words.240  Movie 
quotes become a part of our daily lives and are a 
“particularly powerful means of conjuring up the 
image of their owners, [thus becoming] an important, 
perhaps at times indispensable, part of the public 
vocabulary.”241  Legal regimes that overly protect rights 
holders’ intellectual property restrict the use of well-
known movie quotes may therefore restrict society’s 
communication of ideas.242  Courts should be acutely 
aware of this potential chilling effect on free speech 
and adjudicate accordingly.
The limitation on the protection of movie 
quotes is further buttressed by the fact that these 
movie quotes, in a sense, belong to and derive their 
value from the people.  In the context of trademark 
law, trademarks partially serve to protect the goodwill 
of the trademark owner, which necessarily derives 
its value from the esteem in which consumers hold a 
238.  See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 
1989) (providing a good example of such considerations).
239.  See Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 408 (“[T]he public may 
enjoy the expressive dimensions of a trademark more than it values 
the underlying product.”).
240.  If this line were protectable, countless movies would not 
be able to use this instantly recognizable, culturally significant line.  
For instance, Cypher in The Matrix says this very line to Neo when 
Neo arrives in the “real world.”
241.  Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: 
Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the 
Protection of the Trade Symbols, 1982 wIs. L. rev. 158, 195–96 
(1982).
242.  Id. at 196.
good or service.243  Our culture fills them with meaning 
beyond their original sense, as they appeared as a few 
frames in a movie.244  However, as Professor Dreyfuss 
acknowledges in writing about rights of publicity, this 
can be readily adapted to movie quotes: “[e]ven the 
most heavily recoded image—the image that owes most 
of its strength to meaning provided by the audience—
would be unavailable to the public without some 
investment by its initial purveyor.”245  Nevertheless, 
once brought to their attention, the people add the value 
to movie quotes.  So, logically, the people deserve the 
right to use them freely.  Under the “if value, then right 
theory,” the public has added the value to the quotes, so 
it should have the right to use them freely.
Because our society has incorporated movie 
quotes into its lexicon, overextension of intellectual 
property rights to movie quotes would intrude on First 
Amendment free speech rights.  In copyright, fair use 
and the idea/expression dichotomy are “built-in First 
Amendment accommodations.”246  Allowing movie 
script rights holders to liberally defeat fair use, and 
thus preclude individuals from using uncopyrightable 
movie quotes, would infringe upon free speech 
rights and render the fair use provision meaningless.  
Furthermore, awarding protection to a short phrase like 
“show me the money” would chip away at the idea/
expression dichotomy by practically eliminating the 
merger doctrine.  One can say “show me the money” 
in only one way, and it is a phrase that individuals said 
before Jerry Maguire and continue to say.  If courts 
overly extend protection to movie quotes, individuals 
will live in fear of litigation for potential trademark or 
copyright infringement if they use a movie quote in a 
243.  See mccArthY, supra note 144, § 2.15 (emphasizing that 
a trademark is “a symbol of the good will of the owner’s goods or 
services”).
244.  “Toga!  Toga!” was hilarious when it appeared in Animal 
House in 1972, but it has taken a life of its own after its release into 
the cultural lexicon.  It has remained a vital part of our culture for 
forty years.  This cannot just be because it appeared in a movie.  
Society’s continued use of the phrase perpetuates and increases its 
value.
245.  Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and 
Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing 
the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 coLum.-vLA J.L. & 
Arts 123, 141–42 (1996); see also Allied Artists Pictures Corp. 
v. Friedman, 68 Cal. App. 3d 127, 135, (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) 
(finding, in the context of trademarks in literary titles, that “[i]t is 
unimportant that the secondary meaning resulted from the activities 
of persons other than” the rights holder, and “[t]he critical question 
is whether the secondary meaning had been established in the 
public mind and not the precise manner in which it was created”).  
One could extend this logic to state that regardless of how a movie 
quote has acquired value the right holder should still reap the 
benefits of the value.
246.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003).
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subsequent literary work.247
 As a more specific caution, courts should 
also be careful when protecting movie quotes under 
the Lanham Act.  Allowing a trademark in a movie 
quote used in connection with a movie risks trademark 
law acting as a substitute for a copyright or courts 
finding copyright infringement where there should 
be fair use.  Kamar, discussed above, is illustrative of 
such a proposition.248  While the case has not gained 
traction, it sets a dangerous example for courts and 
rights holders because its analysis provides a means 
for courts to skirt standards for copyright infringement 
and expand owners’ rights into the realm of the 
public sphere.249  Melding the two regimes would 
expand them beyond their bounds and would create a 
chilling effect on how individuals use others’ work.250  
Additionally, fusing copyright and trademark law could 
gut the legislative and statutory intent of the Copyright 
and Lanham Acts, and render the most powerful part of 
these laws meaningless.251  The fusion could produce 
a legitimate fear of over-aggressiveness on the part 
of rights owners in exercising their rights and courts 
acquiescing by expanding the regimes’ respective 
realms of protection.
247.  See Hughes, supra note 46, at 618 (“If a . . . short phrase 
. . . is independently protectable, then a person who thinks she has 
taken just the tiniest bit from a book . . . or other normal-size work 
will find herself liable for copyright infringement.”).
248.  Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Indus., Inc., 217 
U.S.P.Q. 1162 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
249.  See Hughes, supra note 46, at 584–85 (lamenting that 
the Kamar opinion contained “no de minimis discussion, no fair use 
analysis, and no discussion of how . . . quantitatively insubstantial 
phrases were nevertheless so qualitatively important to the film”).
250.  See Zuffa, LLC v. Justin.tv, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 
1106 (D. Nev. 2012) (finding that if the plaintiff “were allowed 
to proceed on a trademark claim for the display . . . or other 
trademarks inherently part of the copyrighted broadcast, [the 
plaintiff] would possess a mutant-copyright or perpetual copyright 
because nobody would ever be able to copy the video and display 
it regardless of whether the copyright had entered the public 
domain”); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 
U.S. 23, 37–38 (2003) (holding that the Lanham Act did not allow 
an author to bring a claim under the Act for failing to give credit for 
uncopyrighted material, because such a broad reading of the phrase 
“origin of goods” in 15 U.S.C. § 1125 would create a perpetual 
right to bring a copyright claim long after the copyright expired); 
mccArthY, supra note 144, § 6:17.50 (writing that trademark law 
“cannot be used as a substitute for a copyright”).
251.  See Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 35 (“Reading ‘origin’ in 
§ 43(a) [of the Lanham Act] to require attribution of uncopyrighted 
materials would pose serious practical problems.  Without a 
copyrighted work as the basepoint, the word ‘origin’ has no 
discernable [sic] limits.”); Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights 
and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual 
Property Protection, 19 BerkeLeY tech. L.J. 1473, 1516 (2004) 
(“Concurrent copyright and trademark protection disrupts the 
balance established by Congress and deprives the public of the 
benefits of the copyright bargain.”).
III. “You Are A verY AdvAnced rAce.    
together we cAn Look For A    
soLutIon.”252 — A PotentIAL steP In   
the rIght dIrectIon
 So far, this article has pointed out the 
expansive rights our legal system could afford to rights 
holders of movie quotes.  Here, this article proposes 
a potentially workable scope of protection for movie 
quotes.  While a detailed proposal is beyond the 
scope of this article, this article lays the groundwork 
for a solution that will satisfy movie quote owners, 
people who quote movies, policy advocates, and the 
courts.  This proposal is situated in a twilight realm 
of protection between copyright and trademark law 
that mimics the moral rights afforded to Continental 
authors.253  Because a movie already enjoys significant 
copyright protection, courts might protect individual 
movie quotes excised from a script and subsequently 
used by and attributed to another through the analog to 
a moral right against the quote’s misattribution.  This 
article offers this solution with the keen awareness that 
such a right could be dangerously expansive, allowing 
rights holders to police and control any use of their 
movie quotes.  This article does not advocate for such 
a broad right.  This proposal is far more limited and 
would be reserved to the use of a movie quote that 
grossly misattributes or misrepresents the movie from 
which it originates.  To illustrate, using “E.T. phone 
home” as the title to a pornographic film could present 
an actionable infringement of the movie studio’s moral 
rights.
Though current U.S. copyright law does not 
recognize “moral rights” in literary works,254 the courts 
252.  Ice Age: the meLtdown (Blue Sky Studios 2006).
253.  These rights are generally understood to be the 
following: (1) the right to nonattribution—that is, to publish 
anonymously; and (2) the right to prevent misattribution—that is 
a right to both prevent your name from being attached to works 
that are not yours and to keep others’ names from being attached to 
your works.  Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing the 
Dastar Gap, 2007 utAh L. rev. 659; 662–63 (2007).
254.  See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d 
Cir. 1976) (“American copyright law, as presently written, does 
not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for their 
violation.”).  The current Copyright Act does contain a provision 
providing moral rights to artists.  See Visual Artists Rights Act of 
1990 (V.A.R.A.), Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, codified at 17 
U.S.C. § 106A (2006).  Specifically, V.A.R.A. extends the rights of 
attribution and integrity to artists whose works are protected under 
the provision.  17 U.S.C. § 106A(a).  However, V.A.R.A. applies 
only to “works of visual art,” expressly excluding any “motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, 
periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic 
publication, or similar publication.”  17 U.S.C. § 101; see 17 
U.S.C. § 106A(a).  Therefore, neither the authors of nor owners 
of the copyright to movie scripts can sue a secondary user for 
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have creatively found ways to provide moral rights-
like protection for the owners of copyrights to literary 
works.  An oft-cited example is Gilliam v. American 
Broadcasting Companies,255 where the Second Circuit 
recognized a cause of action under § 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act in an allegation that a party broadcasted 
a distorted version of the plaintiff’s television show 
Monty Python’s Flying Circus.256  In other words, 
the plaintiffs prevailed on a Lanham § 43(a) cause of 
action based on a misattribution claim.257  This theory 
still holds some sway in the courts.258
There are potential problems with affording 
rights holders something akin to moral rights, 
especially where there is no clear statutory boundary 
for the courts to follow.  Two of these potential 
problems are particularly threatening to the value 
of free expression.  First, there is potential for 
interference with the bedrock principle of fair use, 
particularly by stifling the creation of derivative 
works such as parodies because of the fear of being 
sued for infringing a rights holder’s moral rights.259  
Second, such an extension of rights presents an 
“inherent conflict [with] the desire to allow works to 
become a part of the public domain.”260  Only with 
the development of clear, limited parameters for such 
rights would an equitable balance be struck.261
misattribution or distortion of the script.
255.  538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).  See Ilhyung Lee, Toward 
an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 wAsh. & Lee L. rev. 
795, 809 (2001) (describing Gilliam as “the most celebrated victory 
for authors, the pinnacle of moral rights protections, though under 
Lanham Act clothing”).
256.  Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24–25.  Section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act creates a federal remedy for the use of a “false designation of 
origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading 
representation of fact” in connection with any goods or services.  15 
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
257.  Hughes, supra note 246, at 670.
258.  See Marradi v. Capital Entm’t Indus., No. CV 01-02622 
DDP, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28488, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 
2002) (“An allegation that a defendant has presented to the public 
a ‘garbled,’ distorted version of the plaintiff’s work should be 
recognized as stating a cause of action under the Lanham Act.”) 
(citing Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24).
259.  Kimberly Y.W. Holst, A Case of Bad Credit?: The United 
States and the Protection of Moral Rights in Intellectual Property 
Law, 3 BuFFALo InteLL. ProP. L.J. 105, 116 (2006); Dane S. Ciolino, 
Rethinking the Compatibility of Moral Rights and Fair Use, 54 
wAsh. & Lee L. rev. 33, 78 (1997).
260.  Holst, supra note 252, at 116.
261.  See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and 
Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 notre 
dAme L. rev. 1945, 2006 (advocating for “a narrowly tailored 
right of integrity designed to vindicate the author’s right to inform 
the public about the original nature of her artistic message and the 
meaning of her work”).
concLusIon
Movie quotes are valuable intellectual property.  The 
value of these words is both tangible and intangible.  
Quotes help movie studios generate greater profits 
and merchandizing opportunities, and they enrich 
our cultural lexicon.  The competing considerations 
of rights holders and society—i.e., those who enjoy 
quoting movies—are evident even in listing the value 
inherent in movie quotes.  Our court system has 
demonstrated it will protect rights holders’ property—
including short phrases—in court.  Nevertheless, while 
rights holders should be able to protect and enforce 
their rights, courts should not allow them to trample 
on society’s free speech and cultural commons, and 
society should stand up when rights holders attempt to 
overextend their rights.  Quotes are part of the fabric 
of our society, and we should use them without fear of 
abusive litigation from rights holders.
